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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
under Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended*

ISSUES
The standard of review which is applicable to these issues
is set forth in Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n,
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983):
with regard to questions of "law", at 608.
"In reviewing the Commission's interpretations of
general questions of law, this Court applies a
correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the
expertise of the Commission."
-

with regard to mixed questions of "law and fact",
at 610.
"...on these intermediate types of issues ...the Commission's decisions must fall within the limits of
reasonableness or rationality."

I.

SUBSTANTIVE
A.

In the Stone matter, did the Administrative Law Judge,
-4-

ruling that Krantz made a "false promise of a character
likely to influence, persuade or induce", correctly
conclude that:
1.

A licensee, acting as an officer of a principal in
a transaction, has a duty to determine whether or
not a promise can be performed before making the
promise beyond a contracting party's obligation to
exercise "good faith" ?
law:

correction of error, Utah Dep't of

Admin, Servs. v, Public Serv. Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 1983).
2.

Failure by a licensee to determine whether or not
a promise can be performed before making the promise is behavior so reckless as to render the promise false, even though the promise is conditional
and the promisee has the right to void the agreement in the event of non-occurrence of the
contingency ?
fact and law: reasonableness and rationality, Id.

3.

A debtor acts reasonably in relying on the promise
of another to assume the debtor's obligation, even
while agreeing with the promisor that the promise
is subject to the assumability of the debt being
verified and to the qualification of the promisor
being approved by the creditor ?
-5-

fact and law: reasonableness and rationality, Id.
4.

The Stones relied on the promised assumption to
their detriment even though an arbitration panel
awarded their earnest money deposit to Krantz ?
fact and law: reasonableness and rationality, Id.

In the Gaster matter, did the Administrative Law Judge,
ruling that Krantz committed a misrepresentation by
omission, correctly conclude that:
1.

Krantz, acting as an agent and an officer of a
principal, had a duty to disclose unpaid bills
which might subject the property being acquired
to mechanics liens when the purchasers had independent representation throughout the transaction ?
-

2.

law:

correction of error, Id.

Krantz's failure to disclose the unpaid bills
was intentional even though it was found that he
became aware of the seller's weak financial condition only after closing ?
-

fact and law: reasonableness and rationality, Ido

3.

The Gasters acted reasonably in relying on Krantz
to disclose unpaid bills when they were represented by a licensee who knew or should have known

how to protect them from mechanics lien liability ?
fact and law:

reasonableness and rational-

ity, Id,
4.

Any such misrepresentation was intentional and
substantial, given the finding that the bills were
paid and the liens discharged by the seller ?
~

fact and law:

reasonableness and rational-

ity, Id,
In the Gaster matter, did the Administrative Law Judge,
ruling that Krantz breached his fiduciary duty to the
Gasters, correctly conclude that Krantz owed them a
fiduciary duty beyond closing ?
-

law:

correction or error, Id,

In Stone, was the Administrative Law Judge correct in
applying section 61-2-20 as a prohibitive rather than
a permissive provision ?
-

law:

correction of error, Id,

In Gaster, did the Administrative Law Judge, ruling
that Krantz was "unworthy or incompetent to act as a
principal broker", correctly conclude that:
(1)

Krantz had a duty to protect the interests of the
Gasters after closing ?
-

(2)

law:

correction of error, Id,

Krantz's failure to protect the Gasterfs interests
after closing rendered him unworthy or incompetent

-7-

to protect the interests of the public even though
he had an interest in the transaction as an
officer of a party to the transaction ?
-

fact and law: reasonableness and rationality, Id,

PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
law:
A.

correction of error, Id,

Did the Administrative Law Judge prejudicially violate
the requirement of section 63-46b-10(1) that an order
be issued within "a reasonable time of the hearing"
when the hearing ended on May 30, 1991, and the recomended order was issued on March 18, 1992 ?

B.

Did the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission
prejudicially violate the requirement of section 6346b-10-(l)(e) that the order contain "a notice of the
right to apply for reconsideration" when neither the
recommended order of the judge nor the order of the
Commission contained such a notice ?

C.

Did the failure of the Commission's order to acknowledge that it differed from the recommended order
render it so vague that the true understanding and intent of the Commission is unknown and the order therefore unenforceable ?

D.

Does Krantz have an adequate opportunity to contest the
agency's action as being "contrary to the agency's
prior practice" as allowed under section 63-46b~16(4)
(h)(iii) when:

(1)

The agency's interpretative rules fail to give
adequate notice of the conduct prohibited by the
statute ?

(2)

The agency does not publish summaries of its complaint resolutions ?

E.

Were these and other procedural and administrative
failures a denial of Krantz's right to due process
the United States and Utah Constitutions ?
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES

See Table of Authorities and Addendum,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the court on a Petition of Review from
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order
("FFCLRO"; Addendum "A") of the Administrative Law Judge and the
ensuing order of the Utah Real Estate Commission and Division of
Real Estate (Addendum "B") revoking petitioner Krantz's license
to practice real estate•
The matters with respect to which review is sought arise
from Krantz's dealing with two couples, the Stones and the
Gasters. Based on these dealings, the Division initiated complaints against Krantz, RE87-11-19 involving the Stones and
RE89-03-12 involving the Gasters- FFCLRO pp. 8, 17.
The hearing occurred on May 29-30, 1991; the FFCLRO was
issued March 18, 1992; and the Commission issued its order on
April 8, 1992. The Executive Director of the Department of
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Commerce issued an Order on Review dated June 23, 1992. (Addendum "C")
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Krantz was the principal broker of Copper State Realty
("CSR") and the president of Copper State Construction ("CSC")
when he engaged in four real estate transactions, two each with
the Stones and the Gasters. With both the Stones and the Gasters,
Krantz, as an officer of CSC, agreed to purchase their residences; and the Stones and the Gasters both agreed to purchase
new residences to be built by CSC. FFCLRO, pp. 8-9, 17-18.
In agreeing to purchase the Stone residence, Krantz, as an
officer of CSC, promised to assume the Stone's existing loan
secured by the property. His promise was conditioned upon CSC's
"qualifying for and lending institution granting" the assumption. Krantz intended that the assumption be "simple", but the
Stones expected to be relieved of liability by CSC's either
assuming or refinancing the loan. FFCLRO, pp0 8-9.
The Stones relied on Krantz's promise in entering the agreement with CSC, and neither CSC nor they were aware of the terms
under which the loan could be assumed. FFCLRO, p. 9. However,
the Stones had held out through a previous listing with another
agent that their loan was assumable. Addendum "D".
The parties eventually found out from the lender that there
could be no "simple" or "formal" assumption of the loan by CSC.
The Stones elected to void the agreement because CSC did not
meet the qualification contingency. FFCLRO, p. 10.
-10-

In an arbitration through the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS,
CSC was allowed to retain the Stone's $100 earnest money deposit
from the transaction. FFCLRO, p. 11.
With regard to the Stones agreement to purchase a newly
constructed residence from CSC, Krantz filled out a form which
differed from the one approved by the State for such transactions. The agreement was subject to the Stones qualifying for
financing. However, they were unable to qualify because CSC was
to assume their loan in such a way as to relieve them of their
existing mortgage indebtedness. They therefore voided the agreement and were awarded the return of their $1500 earnest money
deposit in the arbitration hearing. FFCLRO, pp. 9-11.
In the Gaster transactions, an agent from a company other
than CSR prepared the purchase agreements; and she represented
the Gasters in their dealing with CSC in purchasing the newly
constructed residence. Krantz did not represent the Gasters
in this transaction (Addendum "E"). However, he did represent
themin the sale of their residence to CSC. FFCLRO, p. 17.
The Gasters appeared with their agent on April 28, 1988,
to close their purchase from CSC, and Krantz appeared on behalf of CSC. Some time between April 22, 1988, June 14, 1988,
certain mechanics liens were filed on the Gasterfs new home.
FFCLRO, pp. 18-19.
Krantz did not inform the Gasters at closing that subcontractors or materialmen had not been paid, but he was not
aware of CSC's "perilous financial condition" until after
-11-

closing. FFCLRO, pp. 19-20.
CSC made the payment necessary to satisfy the lien
claimants. FFCLRO, p. 19.
With regard to CSC's purchase of the Gaster property, CSC
assumed and agreed to pay their existing debt secured by the
property.

At closing Krantz reasonably believed that CSC would

be able to make the necessary payments. However, after the
Gaster closing until June 1988, other closings were delayed and
sometimes did not occur with regard to properties built by CSC.
During this time CSC lacked the funds to make the payments on the
debt it assumed in the Gaster transaction. FFCLRO, pp. 18-19.
Twice Gaster asked Krantz about the missed payments, leading
in the first instance to a statement by Krantz that a payment had
been made when there was no evidence that one been made and in
the second instance to a statement by Krantz that he would attempt to make the necessary payments. Krantz was aware of CSC's
cash flow problems but took no action to protect the Gasters1
interests after closing. FFCLRO, p. 19.
In September, a notice of default was recorded, reflecting
payments missed from June to September. After the issuance of a
notice of sale in February, 1989, the Gasters settled with the
secured creditor. FFCLRO, p. 19.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. A.

False Promise
-12-

Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz made a false promise of a
character likely to influence, persuade or induce the Stones.
1•

Duty

Krantz's only duty to the Stones with regard to the
possibility of CSC's assuming their loan was to exercise
good faith in making the promise. There is no finding of
fact that good faith was lacking. Also the cases cited for
holding Krantz to a higher standard are distinguishable.

2.

Recklessness

If Krantz had simply made a promise to assume the loan
without its being conditioned upon the verification with,
and approval by, the Stones' lender, perhaps a case might be
made for his behavior being reckless. However, the promise
was conditional.
A fortiori, Krantz's behavior was not reckless, and in
fact it was responsible, given the fact that the Stones had
the right to void their agreement with CSC, a right they
exercised.
3.

Reasonable Reliance

Regardless of Krantz's duty to the Stones and the
characterization of his behavior, it was the Stones1 loan
which was to be assumed.
Before Krantz made the agreement with them on behalf
of CSC, the Stones had the property on the market through
-13-

another agency and held it out as having an assumable loan.
The CSC offer, subject to assumability, could not have come
as a surprise to the Stones; and it was within their exclusive control to contact the lender before offering the
property for sale, and accepting an offer to purchase, subject to the loan's assumability.
4.

Detriment

In an arbitration hearing regarding the disposition
of CSC's $100 earnest money deposit, the panel ruled in
Krantz!s favor. The Stones agreed to the arbitration.
Concededly, damage is not essential for finding a
violation of the licensing law. However, a finding of detriment when either none existed or claims regarding damage
had been freely resolved is substantially prejudicial
to Krantz.
II. B.

Misrepresentation by Omission

Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz intentionally made a substantial misrepresentation by omission in Caster.
1.

Duty to Disclose

Utah law recognizes misrepresentation by omission, but
not in the circumstances of this matter where those who allegedly suffered from the misrepresentation had independent representation in the transaction. The doctrine of
caveat emptor, although appropriately mitigated under
modern law, has not been eliminated from commercial dealings.
-14-

2.

Intentional Failure

The Administrative Law Judge does not even consider
whether or not Krantz's omission might have been innocent
or even negligent, but simply concludes that it was intentional without stating why.
Given the Judge's finding that Krantz became aware
of CSC's weak financial condition only after the closing,
a conclusion that the failure to disclose unpaid bills
was intentional could only be based on unstated or assumed
circumstances.
Furthermore, the payment of the bills and discharge
of the liens by CSC is inconsistent with the conclusion
that Krantz's failure to disclose was intentional.
3.

Reasonable Reliance

For the reasons set forth in II. B. 1., a conclusion
that the Gasters could reasonably rely on Krantz's disclosure of unpaid bills ignores the role and responsibility of their representative in the transaction. No consideration is given to the law of vicarious liability of
a principal, the Gasters, for the negligence of their
agent.
4.

Substantial Misrepresentation

Krantz's failure to disclose the unpaid bills at
closing, assuming he was aware or should have been aware
that they were unpaid, was without substantial effect.
If the disclosure had been made, proceeds to the seller
-15-

from closing would have been escrowed to pay the bills.
The outcome, given the nondisclosure, was the same as if
funds had been escrowed at closing.
I. C.

Termination of Fiduciary Duty

Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz breached his fiduciary duty
to the Gasters.
Krantz's duty as a fiduciary to the Gasters resulted
from a limited agency created contractually between them.
The terms of this agency relationship were set forth expressly in their written listing agreement, and they were
fulfilled at closing.
The Administrative Law Judge does not discuss the
basis for finding that a fiduciary duty existed between
Krantz and the Gasters after closing nor are any cases
cited which would support such a conclusion.
I. D.

Use of Unapproved Form

Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz's use of an unapproved form
was a violation of law.
Section 61-2-20 involves rights and privileges of
real estate licensees with regard to the use of forms
approved by the real estate commission and the attorney
general. Its language is permissive, not prohibitive,
in nature and should be read in conjunction with section
78-51-25 regarding practicing law without a license.
-16-

I. E.

Unworthiness or Incompetence

Krantz was substantially prejudiced by the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusion that Krantz was unworthy or incompetent
to act as a principal broker in such a manner as to safeguard
the interests of the public because he did not protect the
Gaster's interests after closing•
The Administrative Law Judge determines that Krantz
is unworthy or incompetent, but he does not determine
whether it is because of unworthiness or incompetence that
Krantz has violated section 61-2-11(8)• Furthermore, the
Judge's broad conclusion is based on a finding that Krantz
failed to protect the interest of the Gasters after
closing• This conclusion has the effect of imposing upon
licensees a fiduciary duty by statute when section 61-211(16) explicitly envisions such a duty in terms more
compatible and consistent with the common law doctrine of
fiduciary duty.
Procedural and administrative shortcomings with regard to what constitutes unworthy or incompetent conduct
are discussed in II.
II. A.

Timeliness of Order
A distinction exists in administrative law between

"mandatory" and "discretionary" statutory requirements,
and there are cases which hold that "timing" requirements are discretionary. As such, they must result in
"substantial prejudice" if violated to be of consequence .
-17-

An almost ten-month time period between the hearing
and the ruling is too long for the order to reflect a
a fresh evaluation of the evidence by the Judge,
Also the impending decision over the more ten
months created an air of uncertainty surrounding CRS
which had a negative impact on its business dealings.
Be

No Notice of Right to Apply for Reconsideration
Neither the recommended order of the Administrative

Law Judge nor the order of the Commission contained the
"notice of right to apply for reconsideration" which is
recognized under section 63-46b-10(l)(e). The statute is
not limited by language referring to such right "if any
exists".

To deny Krantz his statutory right to such

notice denied him an additional "bite at the apple", thus
substantially prejudicing him.
C.

Uncertainty of Commission's Order
The recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge

was that Krantz's license to practice real estate as a
principal broker be revoked. The Commission's order adopts
the Judge's findings, conclusions and order; but it the
revokes Krantz's real estate license without allowing him
to practice as a sales agent.
The order in this case is contradictory and leaves the
impression that the Commission may not have understood, may
not have carefully considered, or may not have fairly construed the Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommended Order.
-18-

If the Commission did understand, carefully consider,
and fairly construe the Judge's ruling, it did not state in
its order reasons why it imposed a broader sanction.
Finally, the Commission's order may be construed as a
lifetime revocation with the right to reapply in three
years; but it does not state the circumstances under which
Krantz's license should be reinstated.
II. D.

Shortcomings in Agency's Prior Practice
One of the bases for judicial review of formal adjudi-

cative proceedings is that the agency action is "contrary
to prior agency practice". If an agency does not disclose
to those it regulates what its prior practice has been, it
denies them a statutory basis for review.
Here the agency has cited no interpretative rules on
which it relies in imposing its sanction, and it has published no record of dispositions of prior complaints.
This denial of a licensee's statutory right conadministrative entrapment and is unconscionable.
II. E.

Denial of Due Process
Any or all of the above procedural and administrative

shortcomings constitute a violation of Krantz's right to due
process of law.

ARGUMENT

I. A.

KRANTZ MADE NO FALSE PROMISE.
-19-

1.

Sole duty of contracting promisor is to exercise
good faith.

More applicable to the Stone circumstances than any case
cited by the Administrative Law Judge (FFCLRO, p. 12) is the
Utah Supreme Court case of Cerritos Trucking Co, v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982).
Cerritos sought damages or specific performance under
a option to purchase a warehouse, and Utah Venture sought
to

rescind the option based on a claim of misrepresentation.
Utah Venture granted Cerritos a lease-option, relying on an

unwritten representation by Cerritos that certain officers of
another company, Fiber Sciences, would participate in the acquisition under the option. Fiber Sciences occupied the warehouse
as a sub-tenant of Cerritos under the lease with Utah Venture.
Later, the parent company of Fiber Sciences informed the
officers who were to participate in the acquisition that they
could not do so because of a conflict of interest. Utah Ventureclaimed that it relied on Fiber Sciences participation, agreeing to sell the property at a lower price in the hope of gaining
future business considerations.
The Utah Supreme Court upheld a ruling in favor of Cerritos,
finding with regard to the promised participation of the Fiber
Sciences officers that the "evidence reflects nothing but good
faith on their part". Id. at 611.
Although Utah Venture argued that the Fiber Sciences officers should have first sought a legal opinion regarding their
-20-

participation before the representation was made, the Court disagreed. Citing Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P.2d 56, 58
(1933), the Court concluded that, "if the promise is made in good
faith when the contract is entered into, there is no fraud
though the promisor subsequently changes his mind and fails or
refuses to perform".
In Stone, there is no finding of bad faith on the part of
Krantz, but only findings that his intent and that of the Stones
regarding the concept of "assumption" differed.
It's not as if Krantz and the Stones agreed, as did the
parties in Cerritos, and then Krantz changed his mind and did
not perform. Instead, the parties performed exactly as they had
agreed, with the Stones exercising their right to void the agreement when CSC did not qualify for the assumption under an expressly stated contingency.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Welch Transfer and
Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), involving a
real estate exchange contingent upon both parties assuming the
other's SBA loan and being relieved of liability in each case,
"[t]hose mutual conditions were essential as far as both parties
were concerned to the consummation of the exchange .... In the
instant case, neither party could control the actions of the
S.B.A. and neither party was at fault in the failure of an
essential condition precedent." Id. at 76.
Krantz, as the promisor under the contract with the Stones,
was in the same position as either of the parties in Welch
Transfer.
-21-

In the case of Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc,f
22 Utah 2d 202, 450 P.2d 743, 746 (1969), the Court states,
quoting form Ephraim Theatre Co, v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321
P.2d 221 (1958):
* * * Generally speaking, neither of the parties,
nor the court has an right to ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely because it
may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they
must be enforced "in accordance with the intention as
* * manifested by the language used by the parties to
the contract."
In Stone, the Administrative Law Judge ignored in his
findings the contingent nature of the agreement between the
Stones and Krantz. Additionally, the Judge makes no note of
the fact that the contingency regarding the assumption was
to the benefit of the Stones; and if it was a hardship on
anyone, it was a hardship on CSC and Krantz.
This failure of the Judge to consider the contingent
nature of the promise to assume is evidenced by his citing
Galloway v. AFCO Development Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (UtahApp.
1989) and Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).
In Galloway, the representation of the AFCO representative
which was found to be false was not contingent on the veri- *
fication and approval of a third party. In Von Hake, the
issues were the fairness of the parties1 agreement and the
possibility of undue influence by one with a confidential
relationship with the other.
-22-

The very contingent nature of Krantz's promise to the
Stones strongly supports a finding of good faith and fairness;
and the possibility of undue influence was not address by the
Judge.
Reductio ad absurdum, the Administrative Law Judge, by
his conclusion that Krantz made a false promise to the Stones,
is suggesting that a real estate licensee, acting on behalf of
a principal, must eliminate third-party approval contingencies
from all purchase agreement.
For all of these reasons, the Judge's conclusion that
Krantz, acting as an officer for CSC, had a duty to determine
whether or not his promise could be performed before making it
was erroneous, given the absence of a finding of bad faith and
the nature of his promise as being contingent on the approval
of a third party with the Stones having the right to void the
contract if the approval was not obtained.
2.

If good faith is not the correct standard for evaluating Krantz1s conduct and recklessness is, he did
not act recklessly.

It is true that a finding of recklessness can provide a
basis for concluding that misrepresentation has occurred. However, the Administrative Law Judge ruled that Krantz violated
section 61-2-11(2) dealing with "false promises", not section
61-2-11(1) dealing with "misrepresentation". Nonetheless,
whether the Judge is operating under -11(1) or -11(2), it is
difficult to understand how he found Krantz's behavior to be
-23-

reckless, given the contingent nature of his promise and its
design to benefit the Stones as discussed above.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Boston First Nat,
v. Salt Lake Ctv. Bd.. 799 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Utah 1990), observed
that an agency's decision must not be "a creation of fiat".
Boston First Nat, deals with the application of the "substantial evidence" test involving findings of facts and does
not involve a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law as
in Stone regarding the issue of recklessness. As such, however, it is even more applicable given the higher standard of
review in the Stone circumstances.
Recklessness, a term the Administrative Law Judge does
not define, is commonly understood in the context of the law
regarding fraud and deceit to mean reckless disregard for
the truth. See Hull at 58.
Krantz's behavior, "subjecting" the Stones to a contractual covenant contingent upon third-party verification
of the loan's assumability hardly demonstrates a disregard for
the truth; and his providing the Stones with an option to void
the agreement if verification

and approval are not obtained, can

hardly be considered reckless behavior under any meaning of the
term. To have made the promise verbally but not in writing, to
have made it not contingent upon verification by the lender,
to have granted CSC the right to void the agreement if the
verification was not forthcoming, ... any of these actions might
have arguably been considered a reckless disregard for the truth;
but Krantz did none of these reckless acts, and therefore the
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Judge erred in his conclusion.
3.

The Stones reliance on Krantz's promise was
unreasonable.

The Montana case of Van Ettinger v. Pappin, 588 P. 2d 988
(Mont. 1978) involved the issue of whether or not a party to
a real estate transaction could rely as a matter of law on
representations alleged to have been made by a real estate
licensee. Quoting Lee v. Stockmen's National Bank, 63 Mont.
262, 284, 207 P. 623, 630 (1922), the court noted:
When it appears that a party, who claims to have
been deceived to his prejudice, has investigated
for himself or that the means were at hand to
ascertain the truth ... of any representations made
to him, his reliance upon such representations made
to him, however false thev may be. affords no
ground of complaint. Van Ettinger at 994.
The loan which Krantz agreed CSC would assume was the
Stones1 loan, yet the Administrative Law Judge found that they
had no knowledge of the terms under which it could be assumed.
Still the Stones, when they had their property listed for sale
through Multiple Listing with another agent held out one of the
financing terms to be "AE", assume existing loan. They, more
than Krantz or any one else, had it at their disposal to communicate directly with the lender and determine the nature of
the assumability of the loan.
Also it is difficult to imagine the Stones acting in rea-25-

sonable reliance on Krantz's promise, given its contingent
nature, before the contingency was met. In a case where the contingent nature of a contractual promise was much less clear
than in Stone, the court concluded that the parties understood
that the promisor's obligation to perform was contingent. Creer
v. Thurman. 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978).
Again, the Administrative Law Judge errs in drawing no legal
conclusion from the contingent nature of the promise on which
the Stones allegedly rely.
4.

Stones suffered no harm.

The Stones and Krantz submitted their claims regarding the
$100 earnest money deposit to arbitration, and the award was made
to Krantz. The release of the deposit to Krantz is inconsistent
with a conclusion that the Stones were damaged.
Although a finding of damage is not necessary in resolving
a real estate licensing law complaint, it would be prejudicial
to find damage when none should have been found.
The Restatement of Agency 2d, paragraph 419, states:
An agent who has committed a breach of duty to the
principal is discharged from liability by an effective release given by the principal or a contract
with the principal having the effect of a discharge .
The conclusion of the arbitration panel that the deposit
should be awarded to Krantz and the release of Krantz from
further liability should be determinative that the Stones
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were not damaged in the transactions, and the Judge erred
to Krantz's substantial prejudice in concluding otherwise.
I. B.

KRANTZ MADE NO MISREPRESENTATION BY OMISSION,
1.

Krantz had no duty to disclose unpaid bills.

In contrast to the Stone matter regarding the "false promise" charge where the Administrative Law Judge cites (we have
suggested ineffectually) many cases to support his conclusion
that Krantz violated section 61-2-11(2), in the Gaster matter
the Judge cites no cases to support his conclusion that Krantz
made a substantial misrepresentation by omission.
This is another example of the creation of a decision by
fiat. See Boston First Nat, at 1166.
If we try to make the Judge's case for him, we might go
back to the cases he cites in the Stone matter, starting with
what may be regarded as the leading case in Utah involving misrepresentation by a real estate licensee, Dugan v. Jones, 615
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), aff'd on rehearing, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah
1986).

Dicta in Dugan contains the very broad pronouncement

that "[i]n this state, it is apparent that the rule of
caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a real
estate agent". Id. at 1248.
Dugan and its progeny are distinguishable from Gaster for
any of three reason: (1) they involve affirmative misrepresentation, not misrepresentation by omission; (2) they involve only
one licensee; (3) they involve matters which are disclosable
without conflicting loyalties to a principal.
-27-

Much has happened within the real estate industry since
1980-86 to cause one to question the breadth in application of
the Court's dictum. Most particularly, in 1987 the Utah Real
Estate Division adopted an administrative rule which requires
licensees to disclose their agency relationship in a transaction to the principals. Now both buyer and seller know who
represents whom in a transaction, and it is now much more common for buyers to have an agent representing them while another agent represents the seller. See Utah Administrative
Code, R162-6-2-7.
So it was in the Gaster case when their representative, not
Krantz, filled out a purchase agreement which did not provide
for extended title insurance coverage protecting against mechanics liens. Was it Krantz's duty then, as a fiduciary of the
seller, to volunteer such coverage in a counteroffer to avoid
misrepresenting by omission his "duty" to the Gasters ?
And the same issue was present when the Gasters closed with
their representative present and then failed to inquire regarding
the possibility of there being unpaid bills which might result in
mechanics liens. The Administrative Law Judge did not just suggest, he has concluded, that it was Krantz's duty, notwithstanding his status as a fiduciary of the seller, to disclose that
there were unpaid bills whether he knew of their existence or
not.
The Administrative Law Judge has erred in not reconciling Krantz•s fiduciary duty to the seller with his alleged
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statutory duty to the buyer and in not talcing into account
the role and responsibility of the Gasters' own agent in the
transaction and its impact on Krantz1s statutory duty.
2.

Krantz^ failure to disclose was not intentional.

Even if Krantz had a duty to disclose unpaid bills at
closing to the Gasters, the Judge's conclusion that he did so
intentionally is again created by "fiat". One would be hard
pressed to arrive at a conclusion that Krantzfs failure was
negligent, yet the Judge concludes that the omission was
intentional.
The Judge found that Krantz was unaware of CSC's weak
financial condition only after the closing. He also found
that the bills were paid by CSC and the liens discharged. Yet
he concludes that Krantz "should have" disclosed the indebtedness at closing.
In Smith v. Galland and Associates, Inc., 602 P.2d 1197,
1202, (Wash.App. 1979), there was no breach of fiduciary duty
when a licensee failed to protect a party's interests regarding
mechanics liens when the builder subsequently discharged them.
Additionally, there was no conclusion that a duty had been
breached under the statute.
It was erroneous for the Judge to conclude that Krantz"s
omission was intentional when it may very well not have even
been negligent.
3.

The Gasters reliance on Krantz1s misrepresentation
by omission was not reasonable.
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On whom were the Gasters relying in this transaction,
Krantz who represented the seller or the other agent who represented them ?
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Gasters
relied on Krantz without even discussing their relationship
with, and the role of, the agent who actually was their representative. And then the Judge concluded that their reliance on
Krantz was reasonable !
Does the Administrative Law Judge cite cases to support
these conclusions ? Again, the answer is no ... another decision created by fiat.
If Krantz committed intentional, or even negligent,
misrepresentation, wasn't the Gasters' agent a fortiori responsible for misrepresentation ? And shouldn't the Gasters bear the
responsibility for their agent's misrepresentation ?
The Judge was wrong in concluding that the Gasters relied
reasonably on Krantz's misrepresentation.
4.

If there was a misrepresentation, it was not substantial.

Would the transaction have closed if Krantz had disclosed
that the bills were unpaid ? Yes. Why ?

... because when the

liens were disclosed after the closing, CSC paid the bills and
discharged the liens. How can this be ?

... because the alter-

native, no closing, would have benefited neither CSC nor the
Gasters. Worst case scenario, funds would have been escrowed to
cover unpaid bills, and the liens would have been discharged
-30-

from escrow ... the same outcome as occurred with non-disclosure.
Therefore, it was not reasonable, and in fact was prejudicial, for the Judge to conlcude that the omission was nsubstantial".
II. C.

KRANTZ OWED THE GASTERS NO FIDUCIARY DUTY AFTER
CLOSING.

Boettcher PTC Blda. v. Falcon Ventures, 762 P.2d 788
(Colo.App. 1988), involved a question of whether or not a
leasing agent had a continuing obligation to the landlord
during the term of the lease with regard to the agent's
relationships with the landlord and a tenant of the landlord.
The agent had been instrumental in the tenant's negotiating a lease with the landlord, representing the landlord in the transaction as a cooperating broker. However,
when the tenant, after taking possession, was unable to negotiate with the landlord for additional space, the agent assisted the tenant in finding another space; and the tenant
defaulted on the lease with the original landlord.
The Court rejected the landlord's contention that the
agent had breached a duty of loyalty to the landlord in
helping the tenant find another space, holding that there
was no evidence of agreement between the landlord and the
agent that the agent's duty would extend beyond his performance as cooperating broker in the original transaction. Id. at 790.
* * * Upon termination of the agency, an agent
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commended order of the Administrative Law Judge, its order in
this case is internally contradictory and leaves one with the
impression that the Commission may not have understood, may
not have considered, or may not have fairly construed the
Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended
Order. See Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 187, 14
Po2d 973 (1932).
If the Commission did understand, carefully consider, and
fairly construe the Judge's ruling, it did not state in its
order explicitly that it was imposing a broader sanction; and
it did not articulate the reasons why it decided to impose a
broader sanction.
Finally, the Commission's order may be construed as a
lifetime revocation with the right to re-apply in three years;
but it does not state the circumstances under which Krantz's
license should be reinstated, leaving open the very real possibility that a Commission with three new members in three
years might feel compelled to review the matter de novo.
For amy of these reasons, Krantz is substantially prejudiced.
II. D.

Shortcomings in the agency's prior practices have
substantially prejudiced Krantz.

Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) provides that one of the bases
for granting relief upon judicial review is that the petitioner
has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action which is
"contrary to the agency's prior practice".

What safeguards might the drafters of the Administrative
Procedures Act have been contemplating by inserting this provision in the statute ?
1.

consistency
Most would agree that the concept of consistency is

an essential element in the fair administration of justice.
Therefore, it makes sense that an agency's action must be
consistent with prior practice. If it is not, it is implicitly a requirement that the agency action under review
must either be distinguishable from prior practice or be
supported by policies which justify a contrary practice.
How then does one discover what the agency's prior
practice has been, and how does one become aware of the
policies which underlie the agency's action ?
2.

disclosure
Implicit under the section is a requirement that

the agency must make known to those it regulates what its
prior practices are. Otherwise, the agency effectively insulates itself from accountability under the consistency
standard by cloaking its actions in secrecy.
The Utah Real Estate Division and the Utah Real Estate
Commission do not publish for the benefit of licensees what
complaints the agency pursues and how the cases are resolved. The public that the licensing law seeks to protect
and licensees, too, have a right to learn from the misadventures of brokers and agents who have run amiss with the law
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through complaints brought by the Division,
Yet even if complaint resolutions are published, by
what standard is the outcome of these resolutions to be
measured ?
3.

rulemaking
An integral part of the administrative process is the

establishment of standards through rulemaking, a process
which itself is subject to the rules of administrative procedure. If the agency brings an action on a complaint based
on matters not addressed in its rules, it is participating
in a process which is fraught with traps for unwary licensees and which protects the interests of the public through
punitive rather than preventive measures.
In Topik, this court upheld the concept of "peer evaluation" in lieu of specific standards for regulating a
subject "too comprehensive to be codified in detail". Topik
at 34, quoting from Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129
(Utah 1983). However, these matters were not subject to
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
The simple fact that the Administrative Law Judge
cites not one agency regulation supporting his legal
conclusions among the many issues under review in this case
should be sufficient grounds for this court's inquiring into
the adequacy of the Division's regulations. (The only issue
addressed by interpretative regulation is the approved form
issue. See I. D. and U.A.C. R162-6-1, R162-6-2.)
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In this case, such commonly encountered questions such
the following have been raised which might readily have been
answered by interpretative regulations:
Will a licensee's promise be questioned when he
acts in good faith while entering into a contract
as a principal with a non-licensee ?
What does "assume" mean in the state-approved
purchase agreement ?
Will a licensee be held accountable for a nonlicensee's misunderstanding of a term such as
"assume" which, though ambiguous, is used without clarification in a state-approved form ?
Will a licensee be found at fault for relying
on his ability as a principal to make a contingent contractual promise as expressly allowed
under a state-approved form ?
Under what circumstances will a licensee with
a fiduciary duty to one principal in a transaction
be held accountable for non-disclosures to the
other principal when that other principal is
independently represented by another licensee ?
When does a licensee's duty as a fiduciary end ?
Is a licensee, acting as a principal, prohibited
from using a form which is not approved by the
State ?
Is a principal required to use a state-approved
-41-

form whenever a licensee is involved in a transaction ?
Can a licensee he found "unworthy or incompetent"
for failing to perform a duty which does not
otherwise exist under the law ?
If the professional conduct of a real estate licensee
cannot be addressed comprehensively under regulations, is it
not possible that at least the fundamentals be addressed ?
And absent a statement of the agency's position with regard
to the fundamentals of compliance with the licensing law,
are not licensees substantially prejudiced and the public
interest poorly served ?
In D.B v, Div. of Occupational Pro, Licensing, 779 P,2d 1145
(UtahApp. 1989), this court examined section 63-46b-16(4)(e) and
found substantial prejudice when petitioner's cross-examination
rights were violated.
Likewise in Krantz# for the reasons set forth abovef the
petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's
failure to operate under rules and procedures which provide
licensees the full opportunity to challenge the agency's
actions as provided under the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act.
II. E.

THE AGENCY'S FAILURES IN FOLLOWING STATUTORY PROCEDURES
AND IN ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR PROPHYLACTIC GUIDANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF KRANTZ!'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTI-

TUTIONS.
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Utah courts have appropriately avoided constitutional issues
in matters such as this, finding instead substantial prejudice
when agencies have violated statutory provisions such as those
set forth above. See for example, the case of

D.B. But see

Jackson v. State ex Rel. Workers' Comp., 786 P.2d 874, 878
(Wyo. 1990) where the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledges the
applicability of due process standards of fairness under the
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. See Constitution of
the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1; Constitution
of Utah, Article I, Section 7.
However, the finding of the Utah Supreme Court in Vance
that "[m]embers of a profession can properly be held to understand its standards of performance" when applied to the real
estate profession may unfairly give too much credit to the
sophistication of licensees. See Vance at 129. Vance dealt
with the license of a physician; and whether the court was
flattering real estate professionals in Topik or innocently
putting down the academic credentials of physicians, it is
simply unfair to assume that real estate licensees have the
same professional preparation and sophistication as do
physicians.
Physicians have weighty responsibilities and live every
day with tremendous ethical obligations; but, to give just one
example, they don't have to unravel, without regulatory guidance,
the nuances of the law of agency and the responsibilities of
a fiduciary.
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Consider the content of real estate pre-licensing school
curricula and pre-licensing examinations, all approved by the
Utah Real Estate Division and ask: Will a newly licensed sales
agent be prepared to comply with the obligations set forth under the licensing law ?
Then consider the extent to which the Division provides
broker education courses and the extent to which the Division
monitors the efforts of brokers to supervise the activities of
sales agents.
Ask licensees, whether rookies or veterans, to answer the
questions asked in II. D. above.
Then ask whether or not the rationale of Vance

applies

to members of the real estate profession. The answer will be
that it does not.
These issues are raised not to belittle the competence of
real estate professionals in general, but to put matters in a
more realistic perspective.
The Utah Real Estate Division does a commendable job given
its rigid budgetary constraints, and the Real Estate Commissioners give generously of their time in service of their industry
and the public. However, the matter of Krantz exemplifies how
the current administrative and regulatory structure and operation
under the real estate licensing law is just not fair.
In Topik, the Utah Supreme Court issued a veiled invitation for challenges to the application of the first two of the
three rationales supporting the Vance decision. See Topik at
35.
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The invitation set forth in Topik is hereby accepted.
If for no reason previously suggested the order revoking
Krantz's license to practice real estate is not reversedf it
should be now, given the lack of fundamental fairness and the
resulting denial of due process resulting from the regulatory
deficiencies identified in this brief.

CONCLUSION

The Commission's order revoking Krantz's license should be
reversed; and if not reversed, remanded for a resolution of the
errors set forth in this brief.
Additionally, the Court should award Krantz his costs of
defending against the agency's complaints and of obtaining relief upon judicial review, including his reasonable attorney's
fees, as provided under sections 61-2-12(2)(b) and 78-27a.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 6th day of November
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ADDENDUM "A"

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF TOE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License of
Randy R. Krantz to Act as a
Real Estate Principal Broker

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. RE87-11-19
Case No. RE89-03-12

Appearances:
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate
Nicholas E. Hales and Brenda G. Eichers for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of an August
21. 1989 Notice of Agency Action. The notice was sent by certified mail and received by a
Rachael Kranu on August 22, 19<S9. As set torth in the notice. Respondent was iequired to
file a written response with thirty (30) days from the date of the notice.
Respondent did not timely file the written response. By motion, dated November 27,
1989, the Division sought entry of Respondent's default. Respondent appeared for a
December 12. 19S9 hearing on the pending motion before J. Steven Eklund. Administratis
Law Judge for the Department ot Commerce. Given Respondent's appearance and his
assurance a written response would be filed within .• reasonable time, the Court took the

11, 1990. He was also afforded the opporiunity to obtain to legal counsel for purposes of this
proceeding.
On January 11, 1990, Respondent filed a response in both this proceeding and another
case which had been initiated (RE89-03-12). Pursuant to a July 31, 1990 notice, both cases
were scheduled to be heard on August 28, 1990. However, Respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment with respect to each case on August 23, 1990. The Division filed
responses to those motions on September 20, 1990 and Respondent filed a final reply as to
each motion on October 11, 1990.

On March 6, 1991, the Court entered a recommended order as to each motion. On
March 13, 1991, the Utah Real Estate Commission and David L. Buhler, Executive Director
of the Department of Commerce, adopted the recommended orders which had been submitted.
By notice, dated April 2, 1991, both cases were rescheduled to be heard on May 29-30, 1991.
The hearing for the consolidated cases was so conducted and evidence was offered and
received
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order with respect to
both cases for review by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division
of Real Estate:
Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation I)
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either
1975 or 1976 and he received his broker's license in 1985.
2

In March 19X7, Cclso Velez contacted Max Lloyd a sales agent affiliated with

Copper State Realty, icgaiding one oi the brokerage's listings Mr Vole/ and Mr Lloyd
discussed a possible trade of the Velez home. No such trade occurred, but Respondent
subsequently contacted Mr. Velez and indicated he had potential buyers for the Velez home.
Mr. Velez agreed to pay a commission when Respondent inquired if he would do so, should
Respondent sell the home to the potential buyers Respondc • informed Mi Velez the
potential buyers, Phil and Jan Wilson, were his m-laws.

the Wilsons otteied to puichase the Velez home toi S75,UUU The otlei piovided toi a So.l5U
cash down payment and a $71,750 FHA loan to be obtained by the Wilsons. The Velez's
agreed to pay $1,000 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs. Mr. Velez and
Respondent agreed the latter would receive a 6% commission, totalling $4,500. The Wilsons
had provided Respondent with a $100 personal check as earnest money to be deposited on
acceptance of the offer and the transaction was to close on or before May 15, 1987. Sparing
detail, the Velez's accepted the offer on April 12, 1987 and Respondent deposited the earnest

2

money into the Copper State Realty trust account on April 13, 1987.
4. When the Wilsons had not obtained necessary financing by May 15, 1987, the
lender notified Respondent an addendum or another earnest money sales agreement had to be
executed since the closing date had passed. The lender also informed Respondent the amount
of closing costs the Velez's had agreed to pay would reduce the maximum amount the
-Wilseae-eeuld borrow?
5. On May 20, 1987, Respondent prepared a second earnest money sales agreement,
which also reflected a $75,000 purchase price. The Wilson's offer provided for an $800
earnest money deposit in the form of "check and cash" (presumably $700 cash in addition to
the previous $100 check already deposited in Respondent's trust account), a $2,450 cash
down payment and the same amount to be financed as in the April 5, 1987 offer. Since that
offer had been made, loan discount points had decreased. Respondent so informed the
Velez's, who agreed to pay $400 toward the Wilson's total financing and loan costs with the
understanding Respondent's commission would thus increase to $5,100.
6

Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent told Mr Velez that he

(Respondent) might luxe to lend monies to the Wilsons to help with then down payment dnd
Respondent may have also told Mi. Velez those monies would come fiom his commission.
However, Mr. Velez does not know whether any such payment was made and there is no
other direct or circumstantial evidence Respondent provided any such funds to the Wilsons.
7. On May 20, 1987, the Velez's accepted the offer and the Wilsons provided a $400
check U) Respondent payable h» Coppei Suite Realty, as some of the additional s7UO m
earnest money to be paid. Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent leceived the

additional ^7UU earnest money in his uu.Nt account because tne uansauion was scneduied to
close on May 22, 1987. less than 72 hours later.
8. On May 20, 1987, a Mick Quigley (who is Ms. Wilson's father) executed a gift
letter whereby he certified he had or would provide $2,250 to Ms. Wilson prior to the closing
to be applied toward the Wilson's purchase of the Velez home. Mr. Quigley further certified
he expected no repayment from the Wilsons in that regard. Based on the credible evidence
presented, Mr. Quigley provided about $1,500 of those funds (for the benefit of the Wilsons)
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to Respondent's wife (who is also Mr. Quigley's daughter) approximately one (1) week prior
to the closing of the transaction. Those funds were either deposited in Respondent's wife's '
personal account or their joint checking account. This record does not reflect when Mr.
Quigley provided the remaining funds to Respondent.
9.

On May 22, 1987, Respondent issued a $2,000 check to Brighton Bank, which was

thea used-to purchase a-May 22y 1987 cashiers cheok-<otallk*g>-$h45QM payable, to American
Equity (the Wilson's lender on their purchase of the Velez home). The transaction closed on
May 22, 1987 and the Wilsons obtained the funds necessary to close on that transaction from
proceeds derived from the sale of their prior home and the gift monies made available by Mr.
Quigley. On May 27, 1987, the Velez's issued a $600 check to Respondent, representing the
additional commission they had agreed to pay him with regard to the sale of their home.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides a real estate licensee
may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as
an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(I)

making any substantial misrepresentation;

(8)
being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principle broker . . . as to
safeguard the interests of the public . . .;
(15) violating or disregarding the rules adopted by the commission and the
division:
( 16) breaching a fiducial) .:::ty «»v.e«j b\ a licensee1 t«» his principle in a real
estate transaction . . .

Spccnicaiiy. ihe u m s i o n

CUIIICUUN

r\e.N|>ui.ucni i c p i o e m c u in the \<ric/ > ami liu* i.iuier ik*

had $800 in earnest money from the Wilsons when he allegedly only had $100 on deposit in
that regard. The Division also asserts Respondent represented to the lender the Wilsons
would receive a portion of their down payment as a gift from Mr. Quigley when those funds
were allegedly given to the Wilsons from Respondent.
During the instant hearing, the Division presented testimony from Mr. Velez, the
Wilsons and Respondent as to the Velez-Wilson transaction. The Court has considered that
testimony with due regard for the respective ability of each witness to recall the various
4

aspects of the transaction. The Court has also duly considered the manner in which testimony
may have been affected by the self interest of a given witness and/or the respective familial
relationships between some of those witnesses. In many instances, the testimony offered by a
given witness was vague. In certain respects, relatively credible testimony offered by one
witness was either irreconcilable with the equally credible testimony of another witness or
relevant factual issues were not adequately addressed. Given the lack of credible andsubstantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's just-described assertions
are without a sufficient factual basis. Thus, the Division has failed to satisfy its burden of
proof regarding Count I.
With respect to Section 61-2-11(15), the Division asserts Respondent violated R174-42. That rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

4.2

All monies received in a real estate transaction must be
deposited in a separate non-interest bearing "Real Estate Trust
Account" in a Utah bank, credit union, savings and loan, or other
approved escrow depository in this state . . ..
4,2.1
All monies received by a licensee in a real
estate transaction, whether it be cash or check must be
delivered to the principal broker and deposited within three
banking days after receipt of the funds by the licensee.
4.2.5
All consideration represented as received
by a licensee on an Earnest Mone> Sales Agreement or their
document must have, in fact, been received by the licensee

money irom me wiisons or ne oiu not ucpo.Mt in<-*r
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credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the Division's initial
assertion that Respondent did not receive the funds in question lacks a sufficient factual basis.
Thus, the Division has not established that R 174-4-2(4.2.5) has been violated.
It is evident Respondent did not deposit the additional earnest money in his trust
account Further, none of the three exceptions to R 174-4-2(4.2.1) apply in this case. The
just-stated rule expressly requires a licensee to deposit the funds within three banking days
after receipt of those funds. However, that rule is silent whether such a deposit is required if
5

the transaction will close and the funds will be disbursed within three banking days of their
receipt by the licensee.
R 174-4-2(4.2.1) should be applied with due regard for the facts and circumstances of
this case and in recognition of the purpose for that rule, which is to ensure that funds
received by a licensee are properly deposited in trust for the benefit of the party entitled to
those funds. The"closing'staSraent reflectTRSspondentTetained the $800 earnest money he
had received and then offset the commission due to him from the Velez's by that amount
The earnest money was thus effectively disbursed, consistent with the terms of the May 20,
1987 earnest money sales agreement, notwithstanding the fact that said funds were not
previously deposited in Respondent's trust account Since the rule would allow Respondent
three banking days from his receipt of the funds to deposit those funds and the closing on this
transaction occurred prior to that time, compliance with R 174-4-2(4.2.1) should not be
required under those circumstances and no basis exists to conclude Respondent violated that
rule in this case. Thus, Count II is without merit
The Division contends Respondent is unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal
broker

Specifically, the Division asserts Respondent misicpiesented the natine ol the

transaction to the lender as the means to enable the Wilsons to obtain linancing they would
not have otherwise obtained. The Division also argues Respondent manipulated the
transaction: (1) to obtain a larger commission than the Velez's had originally agreed to pay
or (2) to secure more commission funds to be given to the Wilsons to help them purchase the
Vele/ hnnv
Given the lack of credible and substantial evidence presented, the Court concludes the

is no suificient evidence Respondent misrepresented the natuie of this transaction with respect
to either the amount of earnest monies paid by the Wilsons or the source of the gift monies.
The compelling and pivotal testimony on those factual matters should have been forthcoming
from the Wilsons. However, their testimony was either vague or evasive in numerous
respects. The Division has thus failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to Count HI.
Finally, the Division urges Respondent breached his fiduciary duty to the Velez's and
thus failed to act in their best interest when he prepared the second earnest money sales
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agreement to cither obtain a larger commission or secure more commission funds to be given
to the Wilsons to help them purchase the home. Concededly, the operative effect of that
agreement enabled the Wilsons to borrow additional funds to purchase the Velez home. The
second earnest money sales agreement also shifted $600, which the Wilsons would have paid
in discount points for the benefit of the Wilsons, to Respondent in the form of an increased
commission.
Arguably, the Velez's could have negotiated to obtain the benefit of the decrease in
discount points which occurred in the interim with respect to the two offers made by the
Wilsons in this transaction. However, the Velez's understood the changes made by the
second earnest money sales agreement (particularly that Respondent would receive a higher
commission), they realized their net proceeds from the sale would remain the same and they
agreed to thus accept the May 20, 1987 offer and sell their home under those circumstances.
Based on the foregoing, no breach of fiduciary duty has been established and Count IV is
without merit
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Counts HV, as set forth in Case No. RKS7-1 1-19,
be dismissed and no disciplinary action be entered in that regard.
Dated this

1<ST^

day of March, 1992.

J( pteven Elflund
Aaministrative Law Judge
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Case No. RE87-11-19 (Fact Situation H)
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, the principal
broker for Copper State Realty. Respondent was initially licensed as a sales agent in either
1975 or 1976. From 1979 to 1984, Respdriaerif was the vice president 15f WestsfflT"
Development, a construction company. During that time, Respondent was involved in the
construction of approximately 70 new homes in that capacity. Respondent received his
principal broker's license in 1985. Since late-1985, Respondent has been the president of
Copper State Construction. During that time, Respondent was involved in the construction of
over 100 new homes in that capacity.
2. In late 1987, Robert and Peggy Stone owned a condominium located in
Taylorsville, Utah. Based on a referral from a co-worker for whom Copper State
Construction had built a home, the Stones contacted Max Lloyd, a sales agent affiliated with
Copper State Realty. The Stones and Mr. Lloyd discussed the possible sale of the Stone's
condominium to Copper State Construction, coupled with the Stone's purchase of a home to
be constructed by Copper State Construction. Mr. Lloyd introduced the Stones to Respondent
at the Copper State Realty office.
3. Pursuant to a December 2, 1987 earnest money sales agreement, Copper State
Construction offered to purchase the Stone's condominium for $88,000. The offer provided
\\)\' a $100 earnest money deposit, which had been received hy Mr. Lloyd, a S!-Mf,(* ca*Jdown payment and the possible assumption by Copper State Construction of the Stone's

Seller to have the right to market and sell this property any time prior to
completion of their new home located at (Murray, Utah. Lot #5 Ridge Creek.
This offer is null and void if property is sold to a third party prior to completion
of seller's new home
The offer further provided that if Copper State Construction was required to assume the
Stone's existing mortgage "and/or obtain outside financing", Copper State Construction agreed
to use best efforts to do so and the offer was made subject to Copper State Construction's
"qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing". The offer

8

further recited that Copper State Construction agreed to apply to assume the underlying
obligation and/or obtain new financing within ten (10) days after the Stone's acceptance of
the offer. The offer also recites the transaction would close on or before May 15, 1987.
Given the date of the earnest money sales agreement, the just-stated date is obviously in error,
the parties intending the closing to occur on or before May 15, 1988.
4. On December 28H987rthe StcmerffialJr?rcounter offer, whiclfprovidcd they
would not be liable for any real estate commissions. On the just-stated date, the Stones and
Respondent—as president of Copper State Construction-executed a December 10, 1987
contract, whereby the Stones agreed to purchase property located on Lot #5, Ridge Creek
Subdivision in Murray, Utah and further agreed to purchase a home to be constructed on that
property by Copper State Construction. The contract price was $170,000 and the Stones
made a $1,500 deposit toward payment on the contract. The just-stated contract was also
subject to the Stones qualifying for financing on the new home. Copper State Construction
agreed to start construction on or before December 30, 1987 and complete construction within
145 days from that date.
5. The document used by the Stones and Copper Stale Construction with regard to the
Stone's purchase of the new home was not the standard earnest money sales agreement form
for residential construction. Rather, Respondent had obtained the form contract which he
used from a friend who had—in turn—obtained it from an attorney.
6. On December 29. 1987. Respondent-on behalf of Copper State Construction—
accepted the Stone's counter offer. The Sinn earnest money had Nv- • ii-p^siied !»» the
Copper State Realty trust account on December 21, 1987. The Stones relied on Copper State

when they agreed to purchase the new home. Based on the credible evidence presented, the
Stones believed if their condominium was not sold prior to completion of the construction on
the new home, Copper State Construction would either assume the existing mortgage on the
condominium or obtain other financing and~in either case-the Stones would no longer be
obligated on the existing mortgage. Based on the substantial and credible evidence presented,
Respondent only intended to purchase the home on a simple assumption of the existing loan,
which would have been consistent with Copper State Construction's common and preferred
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practice when it agreed to build a new home in trade for an existing residence.
7. As of December 29, 1987, the Stones did not know under what circumstances the
existing mortgage on the condominium could be assumed. There is no substantial evidence
either Mr. Lloyd or Respondent discussed that matter with the Stones at that time. There is
also no substantial evidence Mr. Lloyd or Respondent ever made any inquiry of the lender at
TfiaFUme whether the loan could bfe assumed or that Mr. Lloyd and Respondent discussed any
possible assumption of the loan by Copper State Construction.
8. In mid-May 1988, the Stones contacted Respondent as their new home was nearing
completion. The Stone's condominium had not been sold by that time. The Stones thus
requested Respondent to undertake efforts to assume the existing loan on their condominium.
Based on the credible evidence presented, Respondent informed the Stones he had only
intended to market their condominium for resale, he had only promised to make payments on
the existing mortgage until the condominium was sold and he never intended to formally
assume the existing loan to thus relieve the Stones from future liability for any payments on
that loan. Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented. Respondent—on
behai!Of Copper State Construction—contacted the lender on the mortgage lor the Stone's
condominium and was informed Copper State Construction could not purchase the
condominium on a simple assumption, due to an owner occupancy requirement. When
Respondent subsequently offered to purchase the Stone's condominium on contract, the
Stones declined that offer.
Vi. The Stones had sought financing from Crosslaiul Mortgage 'Vi'spany t«» purchase
the new home. Approval of any such financing was contingent on the sale ol the Stone's

terminating the contract to purchase ihe new home due to their inability to obtain financing.
Copper State Construction could not formally assume the loan on the Stone's existing
condominium nor was it ever Respondent's intent that Copper Sate Construction would do so.
The Stones refused to sell their condominium to Copper State Construction on a simple
assumption because it was never their intent to do so and they had initially agreed to sell the
condominium with the understanding that only Copper State Construction would be thereafter
obligated to make payment in satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness on the
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condominium.
10. On July 26, 1988, the Stones thus demanded return of both the $1,500 deposit
regarding the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State Construction had
made respecting its' offer to purchase their condominium* The Stones also filed a complaint
with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors. On August 1, 1988, Respondent received a notice from
theTSalt Lake Board of Realtorsi concerning that complaint Iniate Augosror early September
1988, proceedings were conducted before a Board arbitration committee. On October 10,
1988, the Stones and Copper State Construction reached an agreement, whereby the latter
would return the $1,500 deposit paid by the Stones and the Stones executed a release of the
$100 earnest money. On October 10, 1988, the Stones received a $1,500 check, signed by
Respondent on behalf of Copper State Construction. When that check did not clear the bank,
Respondent subsequently replaced it with a cashier's check.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 61-2-11 provides a real licensee may be placed on probationary status,
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is
found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence,
persuade, or induce;
(15) violating or disregarding . . . the rules adopted by the
commission and the division . . . .
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when he lepre.Nented iu
ti.
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the Stones relied on that representation in agreeing to purchase the new home from Copper
State Construction and the latter did not assume-or apply to assume-the existing mortgage
on the condominium. The Division further urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(2)
when he made a false promise to the Stones that Copper State Construction would assume
their mortgage and he did not intend to assume that mortgage, as allegedly evidenced by the
provision in the earnest money sales agreement allowing for sale of the condominium to a
third party before closing and Copper State Construction's alleged failure to ever apply to
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assume the mortgage or obtain other financing to do so.
Sections 61-2-11(1) and (2) provide that a substantial misrepresentation or false
promise by a licensee may prompt entry of a disciplinary sanction. Utah courts have
frequently set forth the elements of an intentional, or fraudulent, misrepresentation as follows:
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3)
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b)
made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient1knowIe3ge upon which to base"
such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did
in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and
damage.
Dugan vs. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1980); Nikkelson vs. Quail Valley Realty, Utah,
641 P.2d 124, 126 (1982); Secor vs. Knight, Utah, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (1986); Conder vs. A.
L Williams & Associates, Inc., Utah App., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (1987). Generally, intentional
fraud requires proof of an intent to deceive. Significantly, it has been recognized such intent
may be inferred if a misrepresentation is "voluntarily communicated to the victim with
knowledge that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false, but knowing that the
victim is likely to relv on it",

(ialloway

vs. AFCO Development Corp., Utah App., 777 P.2d

506,509(1989).

It is well settled that a "promise of future performance, when made with a present
intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act in reliance on that promise,
constitutes actionable deceit and fraud."

Von Hake vs. Thomas, Utah. 705 P.2d 766. 770

(1()S5). In essence, a fraudulent misrepresentation «>r a "false promise", as that language i<
used in Section 61-2-11(2), exists if a promise is made without a present intent to perform as
p;v-;v,:\cJ.

(,.;//. .•..;*. \". .';/-( (J i }i'\'t'!upr,:cn;

( -•//>. s;;p;'a: iU'rkt .< v /•;,:;;;, jar ( tntp, /.;;/•». *

vs. Meibos. Utah. 607 I\2d 79N. <S()5 (I9ISU). In other words, the promisor must have had a
"preconceived intention not to perform the promises made." Schow vs. Guardtone, Inc., IS
Utah2d 135, 138, 417 P.2d 643 (1966). The mere fact a "promisor failed to perform his
promise" is not sufficient to establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow vs. Guardtone,
Inc., supra.
Since the falsity of a promise is reflected by the present intent of the promisor not to
perform as promised, such alleged conduct necessarily involves proof of such an intent to
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deceive. Given the foregoing, and with particular regard to the facts of this case, the initial
inquiry is whether Respondent-acting as either an agent or on his own account-made a false
promise to the Stones with regard to whether Copper State Construction would assume the
existing mortgage on their condominium. It is evident the Stones and Respondent shared no
common intent and had no joint understanding that Copper State Construction would formally
-assume Ihe «xigtog-iBeitgage4ft<^«estion.^Therc is^o-«ubstaRUal^vkieiK^-Re&pottdexiU
either directly or through Mr. Lloyd-made any representation or promise to the Stones
regarding the manner by which Copper State Construction could or would assume that loan.
Further, the earnest money sales agreement does not clearly reflect whether Copper State
Construction's possible assumption of the loan would occur through either a formal or simple
assumption.
Significantly, the earnest money sales agreement expressly allowed the Stones to
market and sell their condominium to a third party prior to the completion of a new home. It
is obvious both the Stones and Respondent anticipated that possibility for approximately five
months and Respondent likely hoped the condominium would be sold to a third party before
it became necessary for Copper State Construction to assume the loan. When it became clear
no sale to a third party would be realized, the Stones contacted Respondent and the latter then
inquired of the lender as to whether the loan was assumable.
. Nevertheless, Respondent~on behalf of Copper State Construction—had promised to
assume the loan without knowledge at that time whether Copper State Construction could do
^»> on a simple assumption. When Conner State Construction offered to purchase the
condominium, Respondent did not know under what—if any—circumstances the loan could be
.:\si:n:e.:. Siive. Key •••;;!. :\\ :.:\J: ..:*.

.:v: .v..:.. \ ........:.>:. v.--:U! -:.;•.

^.N;!::,

ihc :•*:..

by a simple assumption, it was incumbent on Respondent to only make such a promise if he
knew Copper State Construction could do so.
Under those circumstances, Respondent recklessly represented to the Stones that
Copper State Construction would purchase the condominium and possibly assume their loan
on a simple assumption without sufficient knowledge on which to base that representation.
Thus, Respondent made a false promise that Copper State Construction would assume the
loan on the condominium by a simple assumption, he had insufficient knowledge upon which
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to promise such action since he did not know whether Copper State Construction could so
assume that loan and the promise was made for the purpose of inducing the Stones to
purchase a new home to be built by Copper State Construction. Further, the Stones acted
reasonably and in ignorance of whether their loan on the condominium could be assumed by
Copper State Construction, the Stones relied on the false promise made by Respondent and
they were thereby induced to act to-thcirinjory and damage. Respondent' thus violated"— »
Section 61-2-11(2).
The Division next asserts Respondent violated or disregarded R174-4.2.7.4, which
provides:
In the event a dispute arises over the return or forfeiture of the earnest
money and/or other trust funds, and no party has filed a civil suit arising
out of the transaction, the principal broker must, within fifteen (15) days
of notice of the dispute, provide the parties written notice of the dispute
and request them to meet to arbitrate the matter. The principal broker
holding the earnest money and/or trust funds must act as arbitrator. In the
event the dispute is not resolved in the arbitration attempt, the principal
broker must, within forty-five (45) days of the date on which the principal
broker mailed or delivered to both parties notice of the dispute, interplead
the disputed funds into the court of appiopriate jurisdiction A cop\ of the
interpleader action must be retained in the principal broker's files until
final disbursement of funds.
The Stones notified Respondent on July 26, 1988 of the dispute regarding both the $1,500
deposit concerning the new home and the $100 earnest money deposit Copper State
Construction had made respecting its offer to purchase then condominium. Pursuant to the
just-quoted uile. Respondent would have had fifteen (15) iLw **i.»m that date to proxidc the
v
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also required Respondent to arbitrate the dispute.
Concededly, Respondent provided no written notice to the Stones and Copper State
Construction of the dispute and he did not request them to meet to arbitrate that matter.
Nevertheless, the Court duly notes Respondent's status as the president of Copper State
Construction. Under those circumstances, it would have been a clear conflict of interest for
Respondent to have arbitrated any dispute between the Stones and Copper State Construction.
Significandy, an arbitration proceeding was conducted before the Salt Lake Board of Realtors
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within approximately five (5) weeks after the Stones notified Respondent of the dispute.
Although there is no evidence Respondent took any action to initiate that proceeding and he
did not arbitrate the dispute, he should be excused from strict compliance with that
requirement of the rule.
R174-4.2.7.4 also requires that if the dispute is not resolved in an arbitration attempt
inducted withiiLfbrjy-friEe. (45) days from the date tfrj» principal frrokqr mailed c^eUyered^
to both parties notice of the dispute, the principal broker shall interplead the disputed funds
into a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Over forty-five (45) days lapsed from the time the
Stones notified Respondent of the dispute until the Stones and Copper State Construction had
resolved the matter by agreement. While it is not clear from this record whether the
resolution of their dispute was a product of that arbitration proceeding or a separate
agreement between the Stones and Copper State Construction, the Court duly notes the unique
circumstances of this case. Based thereon, the Court is not persuaded R 174-4.2.7.4 should be
rigidly applied as to conclude Respondent has violated that rule. Thus, the Division's
assertion in that regard is without merit.
Finally, the Division asserts the contract which Respondent used to clTcct both the sale
of real property to the Stones and their purchase of a new residence was not the standard
earnest money sales agreement for residential construction approved for use by licensees.
The Division thus urges Respondent violated Section 61-2-20 and, as a consequence thereof.
Section 61-2-12(15).
Section M-2-20 provides:
Ren! estate licensees mav fill out those forms annroveri hy the Utah
o v M U I U I C . w i i n ttic i o n u w m i :

c.\Ccjn!i»ii.v

(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any
documents associated with the closing of a
real estate transaction;
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms prepared
by legal counsel of the buyer, seller, lessor, or lessee, or any
legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate Commission and
attorney general have not approved a specific form necessary
to that transaction.
Respondent admits he did not use the specific real estate form, approved by the Commission
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and attorney general, to effect the Stone's purchase of the new home. However, Respondent
urges Section 61-2-10 does not apply because he did not prepare the contract as a licensee or
on behalf of Copper State Realty, but solely on behalf of Copper State Construction and that
Copper State Realty was not involved in that transaction.
No proper basis exists to view the two transactions between the Stones and Copper
•—-State-Construction-as-distinct and unrelated. -MoreoyerrSection 6KWl~can apply whether
Respondent acted in either his capacity as a licensee or on his own account By analogy,
Section 61-2-20 should also apply under either circumstance in this case, even though
Respondent was acting as the president of Copper State Construction when he prepared and
used the contract in question. Consequently, Respondent violated Section 61-2-2(20) and a
further basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect to Respondent's license to
practice as a real estate principal broker.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The recommended disciplinary action with respect to Counts VI-VIII in this case is
addressed below, in conjunction with the findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent to
Case No. RES9-03-12, which was heard on a consolidated basis in this proceeding.
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Case No. RE89-03-12
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The findings of fact previously set forth in Paragraph 1 of Case No. RE87-11-19
Tactual Statement II) are incorporated herein by reference.
2. As of January 1988rJames and Valerie faster owned a house located at 7588Dover Hill Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah. Approximately two (2) years earlier, the Gasters
had listed that property for sale through Terry Hill-Black, a real estate sales agent. Based on
the credible evidence presented, Mrs. Gaster initially contacted Respondent in late 1987 and
she generally inquired about a possible trade of the Gaster home for another residence. Mrs.
Gaster also contacted Ms. Hill-Black about a possible trade of properties in that regard.
3. Based on the more credible evidence presented, Mr. Gaster saw an advertisement by
Copper State Realty and he specifically contacted Respondent to inquire about a trade of the
Gaster residence for a new home. Mr. Gaster met with Respondent in late January or early
February 1988 and Respondent saw the Gaster home, which was available for sale by owner
at that time. Ms. Hill-Black accompanied the Gasters when they saw a new home, located at
358 l£. Bridlewalk Lane in Murray, Utah, built by Copper State Construction.
4. On February 9, 1988, the Gasters offered to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property
from Copper State Construction for $189,000. Ms. Hill-Black, who was affiliated with Gump
& Ayers Real Estate Inc., represented the Gasters and she prepared that earnest money sales
agreement, which provided the Gasiers

W.HJIJ

apply lor tinaneiiv' i!-'. »u»?h r-.wO.-md

Mortgage Corporation.

home for SIU2.0UU. Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented. Ms. Hili-Black
prepared that earnest money sales agreement at Respondent's direction, but it was Respondent
who represented the Gasters as their agent in that transaction. Respondent, acting as principal
broker for Copper State Realty, receipted the earnest money deposit on that offer and he
signed the offer in his capacity as president of Copper State Construction.
6. The just-described offer, which provided Copper State Construction would assume
the $83,000 existing mortgage on the Gaster's home, was also made subject to the following
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conditions:
Seller to have the right to market or sell property any time prior to
completion of home located at 358 E. Bridlewalk Lane, if home is sold
prior to completion of buyer's new home, this offer is null & void.
On February 10, 1988, the Gasters accepted the offer. Five days later, the Gasters entered
into a listing agreement with Copper State Realty, whereby the Dover Hill Drive orooertv was
listed for sale at $94,000.
7. Sparing detail, addendums to both offers were executed on iviarcn i J, i?oo,
whereby the sale price on the Dover Hill Drive and Bridlewalk Lane properties were reduced
to $94,000 and $181,000, respectively. The sale of each property was scheduled to close on
April 1, 1988. The Gasters applied for a conventional mortgage through Crossland Mortgage
Corporation to purchase the Bridlewalk Lane property. Proof of the Gaster's sale of their
home was a necessary condition to the financing on their purchase of the Bridlewalk Lane
property.
8. The closing on each transaction was conducted on April 21, 1988. Respondent, Ms.
Hill-Black and the Gasters were among those present at that time. Respondent signed the
closing statements as president of Copper State Construction. Both Gump A: Ayers Real
Estate Inc. and Copper State Realty shared the commission on the sale of the Bridlewalk Lane
property. Mr. Gaster executed a warranty deed to Copper State Construction, whereby the
latter assumed and agreed to pay an all-inclusive trust deed with a current principle balance ol
SN2.9X.S.24 in favor of a Dean C. Burnham ami Charlotte I.. Bees«»n. Copies \)\ the settlement
statement and the warranty deed on the sale o\ the Dover Dill Drive property were submitted

v. orpuiation c io.se u the loan on me vjasin \ I ' I I I U I . I V »»i m. m i u u -v. JIK Lane j n u p e i i \ m

reliance on those documents.
#9\Based on the credible and substantial evidence presented. Respondent reasonably
believed Copper State Construction would be able to make the necessary payments when
Copper State Construction purchased the Dover Hill Drive property. However, several homes
which Copper State Construction had contracted to build were not timely completed between
sometime in April 1988 through June 1988 and various closings on newly constructed homes
were delayed or did not occur during that time. Consequently, Copper State Construction
18

lacked the funds necessary to satisfy payments due on the Dover Hill Drive property.
10. Sometime between April 1988 and June 14, 1988, three liens were filed on the
Bridlewalk Lane property by subcontractors and suppliers for non-payment of services and
materials provided during the construction of that house. Specifically, a $244 lien was filed
sometime in April 1988 for garage doors which had been installed. This record does not
reflect-exactly when that lien was filecL A..$4,133 lien was filed, on April 2?., ,l98&ior —
materials provided by Jordan Home Builders and a $2,980 lien was filed on June 14, 1988 for
labor and materials provided by Prows Plastering. Respondent did not inform the Gasters at
closing that any subcontractors or materialmen had not been paid. Copper State Construction
subsequendy made payments to satisfy the just-described liens, although this record does not
reflect when those payments were made.
11. Copper State Construction's first payment on the trust deed note was due June 1,
1988. Ms. Beeson contacted Mr. Gaster and informed him no payment had been made. The
latter then inquired of Respondent, who indicated the payment had been made, but not
properly credited. Beyond Respondent's self-serving testimony, there is no substantial
evidence any such payment was made. Approximately one month later. Mr. (iaster became
aware still no payments had been made. Mr. Gaster then contacted Respondent, who
indicated he would attempt to make the necessary payments.
12. On September 4. 1988, a notice of default was recorded which reflected a $4,705
delinquency for non-payment from June through September 1988. On February 7. 1989.
notice was i^vaed of a trustee sale to be conducted wit'1 v°.vc' !•• the P

r

•»' H«'t i^'ve

properly. The Gasicrs subsequently paid $8,75U to relinquish all claims and avoid loreclo.sure
CONCLUSIONS Ol: LAW
Section 61-2-11 provides a real estate licensee may be placed on probationary status,
suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is
found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to influence,
persuade, or induce;
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(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker . . .
in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal
in a real estate transaction.
The Division initially asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(1) when: (1) he
represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would purchase the Dover Hill
Drive property and assume the obligation on that property; (2) the Gasters relied on those
representations when they agreed to purchase the Bridlewalk property from Copper State
Construction; (3) Crossland Mortgage Corporation also relied on those representations when it
granted a loan to the Gasters for the just-referenced purchase; (4) Respondent knew or should
have known Copper State Construction would not be able to make the necessary payments on
the Dover Hill Drive property; and (5) Copper State Construction failed to make any
payments on the trust deed with respect to that property.
Concededly, Respondent became aware of Copper State Construction's perilous
financial condition shortly after the April 21, 1988 closing on its purchase of the Caster's
home. Further. Copper State Construction made no payments with respect to the existing
trust deed on that property. However, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude
Respondent-acting on behalf of Copper State Construction-promised to make the necessary
payments on the Gater's home with an existing intent not to so perform. As previously
noted, the mere fact that "a promisor failed to perform his promise" is not sufficient to
establish a fraudulent misrepresentation. Schow v. Guurdtone, Inc.. supra. Impoitaniiv iheie
is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent knew or should have known Copper State
Co-Txtri: ' - , *\.»i:»i! ' ^ "°. :,N!% :o •*-. .e *!iove ; \ i \ ' , v p . > v ! v i ("«»

» v * v ' • • *•

a u i c c u tn uu MI. u i \ e n liic MMCUOIMI:. UIC D i v i s i o n .s JNSCIIIUIIN UIJI i\e*\pniivieiu \i»'i.r. .:

Sections 61-2-11(1) or (2) in those respects is without merit.
However, Respondent's failure to disclose to the Gasters that subcontractors and
materialmen had not been paid constitutes a misrepresentation by omission. Based on the
evidence presented, that misrepresentation was intentionally made and was also substantial,
within the meaning of Section 61-2-11(1). Whether it is a common occurrence for
outstanding amounts to be owed for materials and labor provided as to the construction of a
new home at the time the sale of that home is closed, Respondent should have advised the
20

Gasters if any such indebtedness existed at the time of closing. His failure to do so
constitutes a violation of Section 61-2-11(1). Fortunately, Copper State Construction
subsequently made payment to satisfy the liens which had been filed on the Gaster's home.
The Division next asserts Respondent is either unworthy or incompetent to act as a
principal broker in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public. The Court
initially notesj^r. Gaster contacted Respondent sometime in June 1988 and inquired why
Copper State Construction had made no payment with respect to the trust deed. Respondent's
subsequent conduct is seriously disturbing in certain respects. Other than his mere assurance
to Mr. Gaster that the June 1988 payment had been made, there is no evidence Respondent
then exercised any reasonable diligence to insure the payment was made and properly credited
as to protect the Gasters' interests. Respondent was also aware of Copper State
Construction's mounting cash flow problems at that time, yet he neglected to disclose that
fact to Mr. Gaster.
Although Respondent later told Mr. Gaster he would try to make the necessary
payments as to the trust deed, Respondent had no reasonable basis to believe he could do $>o.
Further, Respondent still failed to inform the Gasters of Copper State Construction's
deteriorating financial condition. Since Copper State Construction did not formally assume
the existing indebtedness on the Dover Hill Drive property and the Gasters would thus be
obligated to make timely payment in satisfaction of the trust deed if Copper State
Construction failed to do so. Respondent should have kept the Gasters fully informed as to
anv difficulties which Copper Stan' Cuisirvnor.

.MVOUU: M.*J

in making tunelv pavment ot"

that monthly obligation. Respondent\s failure to do .so icquiicd the Gaster.s to subsequent!)

Respondent's misconduct icflects an mexcusjoie tailure to protect the Gasters' interests. He
has thus violated Section 61-2-11(8) and a proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction
in that regard.
Finally, the Division asserts Respondent violated Section 61-2-12(16) when he
allegedly breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Gasters in the transaction under review.
Based on the more credible and substantial evidence presented, Respondent was the agent for
the Gasters with regard to Copper State Construction's purchase of the Gaster's home.
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Respondent thus owed the Gasters a fiduciary duty to act in their best interest. Respondent
breached that duty when he represented to the Gasters that Copper State Construction would
make the necessary payments on the trust deed, but no such payments were subsequently
made.
A considered review of Respondent's conduct with regard to the transactions involving
4he-Stonesand the~Gasters reveals numerous instances when he violated those statutes and/or
rules which govern the conduct of principal brokers and sales agents in this state.
Respondent's repeated failure to adequately protect the interests of the Stones and the Gasters
was often coupled with his consistent efforts to further either his own interests or those of
Copper State Construction. Simply put, Respondent did not act in an honest and ethical
manner and he failed to properly discharge his duties as a licensee. Respondent's multiple
instances of unprofessional conduct warrant entry of an appropriate disciplinary sanction to
thus adequately protect the public health, safety and welfare.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate
principal broker be revoked, said revocation to become e!tecti\r as piovided bv -Section 61-212(2)(c)(i).

Dated this

/ ^ ^ d a y of March, 1992.

EkflHUl
A(Jministraii\c Law JIUILC
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

In the Matter of the License
Of RANDY R. KRANTZ to Act
as a Real Estate Broker

The

foregoing

Recommended

Orders

ORDER

CASE NO. RE87-11-19
CASE NO. RE89-03-12

Findings
on

confirmed and adopted.

the

of

Fact, Conclusions

above-referenced

cases

It :s fmtrho?

license ioi al

1<\J:;( I

Law

are

and

hereby

The license of Randy R. Krantz to act as a
O LU^ & o

real estate licensee is hereby revoked, effective
]QQr!.

of

oidoiod that ho may not apply

foi a now

hi ^o yo t ns; howevi : , no pi<jmi.»c d. i;uo'» t lur

a new license will be granted upon a future application.
DATED this

,

%-tiu

day of

ApnL

U i'.nn

i

KL.-iu

, 1992.

wOlniL/'^UuUioOiw^

i

PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER

Plb^vJBETH TOLBERT

St-MONS, JR

H

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY
—

«a-vs/"tfie undersigned

T T ordeTls-3SHH-rma-a^ a p p r o v e d I b y t h ^

The aboye^ Order xs^ ^
x
this
—

^

£

BLAINE E . i i W J - ^ T c.crraTF
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

1992.

ADDENDUM

"B"

BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

In the Matter of the License
of RANDY R. KRANTZ to Act
as a Real Estate Broker

ORDER .
CASE NO. RE87-11-19
CASE NO. RE89-03-12

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended

Orders

on

the above-referenced

cases

are hereby

confirmed and adopted. The license of Randy R. Krantz to act as a
real estate licensee is hereby "revoked,-effective" O U ^ ' o *
1992. ~ It-'is further ordered that * he may not-apply for a new
license for at least three years; however,-no promise is made that
a^new license will be granted upon a future application.
DATED this

%-rtu

day of

Aftc\ i

, 1992.

UTAH REAL ESTATE^ COMMISSION
/

S/U/

//

/!

i cc^Jy I U<.-a.^L'L/> JL-/. / <"t .LA 1 it is
PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER

BETH TOLBERT

i

siatoNs, J R - T

CLAUDIA E. ASHBY

(J

confirmed and aoDroved by the undersigned
of
(ffiAcf
, 1992.

BLAINE E.PrWITCHELL, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

ADDENDUM "C"

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE
OF RANDY KRANTZ TO ACT AS A
REAL ESTATE PRINCIPAL BROKER

:
:
:

ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. RE87-11-19
CASE NO. RE89-03-12

INTRODUCTION
This

is

a

review,

upon

the

request

of

Randy

Krantz

("Respondent") of a decision of the Real Estate Commission (the
"Commission") and the Division of Real Estate of the Department: of
Commerce

(the

"Division"), dated April 8, 1992, which revoked

Respondent's license to act as a Real Estate Broker. The Order was
the result of consolidation of the two above-referenced cases.
There was no oral argument in connection with this review, and
Respondent represented himself during the review process.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
63-46b-12,

and Rule 151-46b-12

of the Rules of

Procedure for

Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.

THE ISSUES REVIEWED
Respondent

did not clearly

identify those facts

from the

Order's Findings of Facts which he disputes on appeal.

From

Respondent's lengthy narrative supporting his request for review,

the issues can be summarized as follows:
1.

Whether the Board's and Division's Orders are supported

by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and
2.

Whether the length of time which passed between filing

the petitions, and issuing the Order, prejudices Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Division

The Findings of Fact adopted by the Commission and the
are adopted

for purposes

of

this Review.

They are

lengthy, and will not be repeated herein. With respect to Case No.
RE 87-11-19, a portion of the Complaint was dismissed, as the Order
concluded that the Division had not met its burden of proof with
respect to the complaint involving the Velez's.

Respondent does

not appeal that portion of the Order, and, consequently, it is not
reviewed herein.
2.

Respondent offered his version of events in his request

for review. However, he did not clearly indicate which Findings of
Fact he believed to be incorrect or unsupported by the evidence.
It

appears

that

Respondent

was,

in

the

request

repeating the evidence he presented at the hearing.

for

review,

The Board and

the Administrative Law Judge were present, heard the testimony of
both sides, and weighed the evidence.

Respondents' repeating his

evidence in the request for review does not constitute sufficient
grounds to overturn the Findings of Fact.

For any findings to be

overturned on review, Respondent would need to show how a finding
of fact was made erroneously, or was not based on the evidence
-2-

presented, and show how his version of the facts was supported by
the evidence.
3.

Finally, much of Respondent's assertions in the request

for review, even if true, would not materially change the outcome.
In Case No. RE87-11-19, the Order was based on a finding that
Respondent

made

a

sub3iaLntia*^wfcS^^fes6ntati.o'r

The

fact

supporting this finding was primarily that Respondent had offered
to assume the Stones' loan, and that such promise was made
recklessly because Respondent did not know whether or not he would
be able to assume the loan, or disregarded evidence that he would
not be able to do so. Respondent, in his request for review, does
not dispute that he offered to assume the loan.

Nor does he

dispute that his company was in serious financial difficulty at the
time.
4.
a

The Order also was based on the fact that Respondent used

f^y-m not- annrnvpH hv the Division, in connection with the

contract which Respondent used to effect the sale of property to
the Stones and the Stones' purchase of a new home. Respondent does
not dispute that the form was unauthorized, but asserts that
authorization was not required because the transaction was on
behalf of Copper State Construction, rather than Copper State
Realty, and the two entities were not related.

Thus, the Finding

of Facts on this point -- that Copper State Construction entered
into an agreement to purchase the'Stone's existing home, as well as
a second agreement to sell another home to the Stones, and neither
form was approved by the Division
-3-

—

is upheld; the legal

consequence of this Finding (whether Copper State Construction is
"related" to Copper State Realty and, thus, approval was required
-- is discussed below, in the Conclusions of Law.
5.

In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the Order was based on a finding

that Respondent had £^i^j^Jfc^di s c1 a? e existing liens and potential
liens against the home sold to the Gasters, and had^failed to,
ciiscl^e ^Cfcpper State Construction's
Gasters,

at a

time when

financial problems to the

it had undertaken

certain

obligations and was unlikely to be able to meet them.
before,

Respondent

specifically

reasserts

his

version

of

financial
Again, as

events

without

showing how the Findings of Fact were incorrect.

Indeed, Respondent acknowledges the existing liens on the Gaster's
home, and that suppliers had not been paid at the time of closing.
6.

The other key finding of fact in that Order was that

Respondent had been acting in the capacity of an "^gig&fc>& for the
Gasters, thereby owing them a fj^^^T^rfl^ti\/

Respondent appears

to assert that he was not in fact the Gasters' agent, because
Copper State Realty had no listing agreement with the Gasters to
sell their old home, and a commission was not charged.

The request

for review acknowledges that Respondent inspected the Gaster's old
home; discussed with the Gasters the possible purchase of the home
by Copper State Construction; allowed an earnest money agreement to
be prepared which showed that Copper State Realty would deposit
money into its trust account; that Copper State Construction was to
make payments on its purchase of the Gaster's old home; that
Respondent was making decisions as to whether or not to rent the
-4-

old home

("we believed the home to be more marketable if it was

vacant"); and that Copper State Construction "intended to sell this
home".

It

is

impossible

to

find,

given

these

facts

and

circumstances, that Respondent did not act as an agent for the
Gasters.

Whether or not he believed he was an agent, certainly the

Gasters were entitled to believe that he was their agent, acting on
their behalf,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In Case No. 87-11-19, the finding that Respondent made a

substantial misrepresentation in his promise to assume the Stones'
loan

constitute

sufficient

evidence

to

find

that

Respondent

violated §61-2-11(1) .
2.

In Case No. 87-11-19, the Conclusions of Law also found

that Respondent used a form not approved by the Division, in
violation of 61-2-20, and that this constituted grounds for action
against

Respondent's

license

under

§61-2-12(15)

apparently a misprint, and should be §61-2-11(15)).

(which

is

That portion

of the Order also references §61-2-10, making it unlawful for an
agent to accept consideration from anyone other than his principal
broker.

Respondent asserts that Copper State Realty and Copper

State Construction
possibly

know

were not

about

the

related,

financial

and

that

condition

one
of

could
the

not

other.

Respondent was President and director of Copper State Construction.
His wife was owner of 50% of the shares.
statement

that,

since

he was

not
-5-

an

In light of this, his
owner

of

Copper

State

Construction he did not know of its financial problems is plainly
without merit.

And, in light of the fact that Respondent was

principal broker for Copper State Realty, the conclusions that the
transactions were related and should have been evidenced by use of
a form approved by the division are upheld.
3.

In Case No. RE 89-03-12, the failure to disclose existing

liens and unpaid debts constituted substantial misrepresentations
under the circumstances, and the Conclusions of Law that Respondent
violated. §61-2-11(1) are upheld.

Similarly, Respondent violated

the fiduciary duty he had to the Gasters to disclose the financial
problems of Copper State Construction.

The original conclusion

that his failure to do so constitutes a violation of §61-2-11(8)
and §61-2-11(16) is upheld.
4.

With

respect

to

whether

delay

between

filing

the

Petitions and issuing the Order should constitute grounds for
overturning the Order, the key length of time is the approximately
nine months which elapsed between the date of the hearing (May 2 9
and 30, 1991) and the date of the order

(April 8, 1992).

The

original

August

and

petitions

were

filed

during

of

1989

consolidated shortly thereafter so as to be heard in one hearing.
Respondent originally defaulted, having failed to answer, and was
granted an extension of time by the Administrative Law Judge to
answer the Petition.

Respondent also moved for summary judgement

during the interim before the hearing, and certain settlement
negotiations occurred, which also cause delay in the petitions'
being heard. The Recommended Order was prepared on March 18, 1992,
-6-

and adopted by the Commission -- which typically meets only once a
month —

on April 8. Respondent is understandably unsatisfied with

the delays in this case.

Some of them were at his behest.

There

cannot be an absolute time of delay between a hearing and issuance
of an order which can be held to be both unreasonable and injurious
to Respondent.

Although it is unfortunate, it is not clearly

unreasonable, given that the case involved two separate petitions,
which between them set out three different factual situations. The
hearing consumed two days and there evidently were a large number
of witnesses and abundant documentary evidence to consider.
was no
pendency

There

formal restriction on Respondent's practice during the
of

unreasonable

these matters.
or

so

Therefore,

injurious

to

the delay was not so

Respondent

as

to

require

overturning the Order.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The Order in this case is upheld.

Pursuant to Department Rule

151-46b-12 (B) , the effective date of that order is now ten (10)
days after the date this Order on Review has been mailed to all
parties, or June^> , 1992.

Dated this

^ /

day of June, 1992.

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce
-7-

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the
^^^
day of June 1992 I caused to
be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review,
properly addressed, postage prepaid, (unless otherwise indicated)
to:
Respondent:
i/Randy Krantz
2216 East Lauri Kay Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Attorney for Respondent:
Nicholas E, Hales
Woodbury, Jensen, Kesler & Swinton
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
Blaine E. Twitchell, Director
Division of Real Estate
P.O Box 45806
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0806
Robert Steed, Assistant A.G.
Beneficial Life Tower
11th Floor
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

"E"

——
Yes(X)

EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREED IT

No(0)

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

+

DATE:

1
J O c,n/^
* » » ^ V.
**.
• *n
t KJ3 ^jtctio
v i j i i f ti_^ ifc.Q-gjjtcr
. v^ LA , A ^ - f
f

lersigned Buyer

EST MONEY, the amount of

(

f ''-/{/ *&U C/H V.1 -( iVc^l , ,i j [r c J

nof f( r -, it >t ITC*CK«

rW^/,r,.J/JJ
ill be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. / - "t ^ - - r i ^ ' « - * - '
fr\>KyX£

^

^ ' ? 4
Pnone Number

hereby deposits with Brokerage
v

S^~

"" % Dollars ($

\tf-(

J ,

y^/^t^z^A^^
L
-

Received by

A

A 'J '

fe*Z&

OFFER TO PURCHASE
3PERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at
J
JLu^lUUli)^
in the City of /1 lU f fa^j
County of
<*H-f
L / i k ^

, Utah,

[o any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
nee with Section G. Said property is owned by.

LiUZ

X H* ' li

JL2

as sellers, and is more particularly described

r

)K APPLICABLE BOXES:
INIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
• Vacant Lot
• Vacant Acreage
• Other
IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
• Commercial
[-^Residential
D Condo
D Other
Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property,
e following personal property shaH also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: ''./- / ^ i l* LJ* i
i Excluded Items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:

*

) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price:
public sewer
septic tank

Unconnected
Crconnected

other sapitary system
>ublic water
-private water

0Q- well
G3 connected
GPother
Q irrigation water / secondary system
# of shares

connected

dfcv antenna

Unconnected

BSnatural gas

CJ

Qrelectricity
[^connected
G i ingress & egress by private easement

Company

Grdedicated road

Bmaster antenna Zrprewired
[^connected

[Zrpaved

C-Surb and gutter
B-Pother rights

d) Survey. A certified survey C_fthall be furnished at the expense of
prior to closing, [2SshaJl not be furnished.
e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical
widition, except: t'-Jftr
\C pL C t C < j)l U j U I I U j n t U , p \j C \ c C ' l O O U l f l
i«. C \ H - ql 11 C f j f C f 7 6 7 J

»
PURCHASE PRICE ANDj|NANCINeHRhe4QtaJ^rchase price for the property is V- > O '
/ -/• ™•

n

-1. •

\IQJ< <
<

^ » k jfcJC I j / \\X j I Hi K-TvJ f U tzC'tl

( J "~

^
Dollars ($ *' 'J ^ ^
) which shall be paid as follows:
which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears interest at
% per annum with monthly payments of $
which include:
• principal;
• interest;
• taxes; • insurance;
• condo fees;
• other
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
% per annum with monthly payments of $
which include:
D principal;
• interest;
• taxes; • insurance;
• condo fees;
• other
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or, seller financing, to be paid as follows: l
/
*

11 j i V i •" -'- • •* i J L *>-4 j . . » l a / ' j * - *

**''« -

- * J> '• < k ij~'{ji->

Other

l&itCCC

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts
i assume and/or procure same and fois offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees
> make application within
days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
n interest rate not to exceed
%. If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within
~ J A ^ days after Seller's acceptance
f this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon wrjjten notice. Seller agrees to pay up to
' ^~
mortgage loan discount
-««•« not to exceed $
_J
. In addition, seller agrees to pay $
"
to be used for Buyer's other loan costs.

.... .-fc. owe
Tesents that Seller f^holds title to the property in fe< ^ttple DTs purchasing the property under a real
estate contract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest sha.. ^ made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnisi. _ od and marketable title to the property, sybject
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein*, evidenced by BJ-a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price & a n abstract of title brought current,
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H).
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to,
i title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer shall tak© title
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions, (CC & R's). Buyer Q r \ has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement.
5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:. 1r*
<J

<d-

6./SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained
contained in
in section
Section c,
C, the
the following
following items
items are also warranted:

±i

nt^>.

taintJLA

, ;uJ.L/jy
/ ; y> vy

w

!</•>

'deceptions to the above and Section
ion 6 shall be limited to the following: _

cuiL-iiz

-:///•*-&-tci

Jam

7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
to dosing:^'
' ' s J'/
' " / - * I-•, /
' -/ ' -<-'•' f i'<
, /
/'If
',.//'ifil

2.t.

irfil /,

8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before
at a reasonable location to be designated by
,19
tiler, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow' closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
s Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of -, Qntete of possession Opiate of closing •
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on

*h

other

unless extended by written agreement of parties.

10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the, signing of this Agreement the listing agent
represents ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer,
/•
i the selling agent
. represents ( ) Seller ( X Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement
tten disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her. (
)(
) Buyer's initials O i ^ ( - \ ^Seller's initials.

-tern

1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BE^N
5EPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.
2. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
9 until JYEY

:

C \

fflbNPM)

rsigoatike) ~~7

rcjj-

J&j

.-

, 19 ZO

r

to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARk LST
r

l\iC >,T- V

d. -i -

V^<
~
~~t

(Date)

J^tcW^ i l

(Address)

/
er's Signature)

—

Iti*

(Date)

£&-*>•

*Lj

5m-

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

•"'JMtxi A JS\
(Address)

CKONE
/
VCCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
REJECTION. Selle.r hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer
(Seller's initials)
JOUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEP the foregoing offer SUBJECTJTO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
sents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until.
(AM/PM)
, 19
to accept the terms
cified below.

if^JcukJju

C^rv<Mi^u-^<^^

's Signature)

^

s Signature)

<t".QQ

! « . .

?r\ £-<?-«&£

^35

uO^ S5oOSo- i ^ « r

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

3JO-2L
(SSN/TAX ID)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CONE:
CEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
JECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.
(Buyer's Initials)
UNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

; Signature)

(Time)

(Date)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).
^-acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
!EOF SELLER

fj_ y

~Y

<'
^

SIGNATURE OF BUYER
^

3

•

*

*

•

&
Date

Date

I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.
Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the •
Be of a four nam* #«"••

Seller • Buyer. Sent by

Date

.,19_

-by

EARNES

MONEY SALES AGREE ENT
Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

REALTOR
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating,
conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, winv and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit[s)t fencing, trees and shrubs.
3. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as
its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection,
id inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
2. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
will not be remedied prior to dosing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
3 brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in
itisfactory working condition at closing.
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
ontinued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller
las no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case,
ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth
in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shad become null and void.
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title.
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defects) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any
cancellation charge.
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prioi
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objectk>n(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void.
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new lease;
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.

K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants
tas or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any
md all pnor negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agreelent This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wnting and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
Dt expressly modified or excluded therein
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
tyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
iuding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap:abie law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an inpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the
nest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bnnging the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
5 incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
' ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
b) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in wnting to repair or replace damaged property
to closing or declare this Agreement null and void if damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in wnting to repair
place and does actually repair and replace damaged property pnor to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be dosed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, stnkes,
lood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter,
s of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
red by all parties to the transaction
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (te) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing
surance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and intciest
umed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
ing
EAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those exherein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
ing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
contract therein
ITICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
vent with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
latically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf ef the
r the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice
OKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office
fS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

)UR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM.

I HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THP n c c i / ^

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes

( ) a COUNTER OFFER

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the
. >, /

//,/, >

, y l ' H F
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1

(/)

an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

< day ot
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and C(,\>p(

*~

19

* between^

L

L-.—

'(/ flC< ft - t r , f ? C f 1 asseller(s)

A (.tkM

covering realjDroperty descjibed as follows

The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT
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All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until
19
Date
Time

v

, ~* I V
f

i

,'.

(AM/PM)

to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse
!

' (

Signature of ( \Seller (\() Buyer
(AM/fPfA)

-

^ > ,

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER REJECTION
Check One
(^ ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum

^SLS>

{

I *
Signature
) I hereby reject the foregoing

J
Signature s\
(Initials)

Date

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures

5 ^O^
Time

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

fc^Vw^t-^
~v% £s fcS%-<!x^-^r— 2 - VSfc
Signature of Buyer(s)
{
19

Date

Signature of Seller(s)

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on
by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer

Date

1

^

ADHENDUM/COUNTER OFFER

TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER const.tutes

( ) a COUNTER O F F E R fl() an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the

( ii kj

\

jitu^A-

<££•&.

f' *) day of

Qs buyer(s), and

covering real property described as follows

_ , ,

/

F(. L!"'-rlry,

™?X_

^C J -j <• i' - "'/ / A - *
. .

, ,

between

~^^SV'

'-' ' / ^ / A £
i .

J&^f

/

* i£ £ . Lf iJk, <, OIKbf*- /.',< rrn\t.(Lfah
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT

I.

PAM.JU

to

M<

$\%\>QQQ'<ro

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( \ ) Buyer shall have until

f)'.GC5

(AM/PM)

to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse
Date

3 " I S ' "tO

Time

2 *2>Q

Signatu?e of (^) Seller ( ) Buyer

(AM/PM)

SJ^^C^j

f.

KA^^^Z K^UX^„

^Afpe* iMcJjt

tt&^A , fL.w .

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION

Check One
^ N ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TJO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum
Signature
( Y J hejjeby reject the foregoing

^

Signature "
(Initials)

Date

Time

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

( ^) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all suftiatures

(
19

/"*

i /

_ x /•>

I |^Signature
Signature of Buyer(s)
Date
^SignatureofofSeller(s)
Seller(s)
) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on
by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer

Date

ADDENDUM "F"

...w.^w-i o M L t b AGREEMENT
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
DATF

he undersigned Buyer

Copper S t a t e

2 Dec 1987

Construction

EARNEST MONEY, the amount of O n e h u n d r e d

hereby deposits with Brokerage

S Tlo/100

Dollars ($ - 0 0 * 0 0

)

ie form ofRuyer's check to be deposited upon acceptance of t h i s offer.
:h shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law

ppper State Realty

263-3102

cerage

.

ReCe.vedby

Phone Number
OFFER TO PURCHASE

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at

86 W_ Central Park Cir .m the c.ty of Taylorsville

county of Salt Lake

utahf

ct to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
dance with Section G Said property is owned by R o b e r t

27th S t r e e t Condo

G Peggy

Stone

as sellers, and is more particularly described

fc

ECK APPLICABLE BOXES
UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

•

Vacant Lot

•

Vacant Acreage

IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

•

Commercial

•

Residential

3

•

Other

Condo

_ _
•

Other

) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
ie following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title J_C_ie
l Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale

None

CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
>ublic sewer

3

connected

D well

eptic tank

•

connected

•

ther sanitary system
ublic water
rivate water

connected

# of shares

CXconnected
•

•

Q electricity
•

Company

Q TV antenna

connected

D other

irrigation water / secondary system

•

S3 natural gas

master antenna

Unconnected

ingress & egress by private easement

__ dedicated road
•

prewired

C_t paved

S curb and gutter

__ connected

D other rights

Survey. A certified survey D shall be furnished at the expense of

prior to closing, Q C shall not be furnished

3uyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical
Jition, except

,

CHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is
_

Eighty-eight

Thousand

__

Dollars ($ 8 8 ^ 0 0 0 . 0 0

_

) which shall be paid as follows

l O O . f l O which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT
t0OtOQ
)00«0Q

representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears interest at
which include

C8 principal,

8.3
H

interest,

% per annum with monthly payments of $
OS taxes,

E_ insurance,

•

OOo*

condo fees,

•

other

representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
which include

D principal,

D interest,

•

% per annum with monthly payments of $
taxes,

D insurance,

D condo fees,

D other

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows

Other .

LOO

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts
nd/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
Itcation within
te not to exceed

10
8*57

days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
o/0 |f Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

30

ment this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to
exceed $

In addition seller agrees to pay $

Q

days after Seller s acceptance
Q

to be used for Buyer s other loan costs

mortgage loan discount

NDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller * oresems inai o«..o. ^
itract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest sh&

nade as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnfc.

MJ and marketable tme 10 um yiup*,. v ,

brances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by QCa current policy of title insurance in the amount of pi «nase price D an abstract of title brought current,
torney's opinion (See Section H).
iPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. Buyer shall take title
any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has Cfchas not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement.
iSTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:

As directed by Buyer

-

.

_

zLLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:.

>ns to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:.

PECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied

closing: Seller to have the right to market mdsell^this^prc^ert^
pletion of their new home located at ^ ; j f f i p B ^
,
s offer is null and void if property is Sbld to^a thirdNparty prior to completion
lers new home,
IS May

CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before

-,19

87

. at a reasonable location to be designated by

subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
jreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of
POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer o n D a t e

•

date of possession Q date of closing •
01

Closing

AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent M a x
e selling agent

K,

other

•

;

unless extended by written agreement of parties.
Lloyd

represents (

) Seller ( X ) Buyer,

Max K. Lloyd

represents ( ) Seller (X )'Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement
i disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. (
)(
) Buyer's initials (
) ( < ) Seller's initials.
GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
:PTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
until N n n n
(AM/PM) %6
6Y/ to the Buyer.
^/_
sr's
VJ
r's" Signature)
Signature) [( ^
/ JJ
r's'Signature)

j ~4

Dec
^
^
^ (( NV /

""

19 8 7

, to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST

j ((Date)
J'
(i

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

:CK ONE
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer.

(Seller's initials)

COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the a^ached Addendum, and
resents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until
perifred below.

jfle

Seue/L

d

-&jr-£^£^r~

Nor

, 19 ^ Q

HAe><~£ ft>(^ /\-*/y

/VV^7

/-'op P*

ESTATE

ZciL ce*rmt frc/fz. i67-39<n~ sw-nt-m

Signatun

Jeter's

/%//<.

to accept the terms

(Address)

•

M£U

ire)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

3/o

HECK ONE:
jfl ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
3 REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.

(Buyer's Initials)

Q COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

i$ri
s Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
r Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).
A. I S I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
SELLER

SIGNATURE OF BUYEJ

fs^JULcMc^A.

+3
-i^iy^'^mJU
B. •
-

Ccnft^&ot

J^AJJL

I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.
-*.._:, — ,

rotllpn r A c e j D t

attached hereto to the •

Seller • Buyer. Sent by -

-

>

•

•*

•.

JU^

IZ-^-37
Date

.,19.

-by

ADDENDUM
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Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

majority, men uum v»*^ . _
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.
AMENDMENT XIII .
Section

AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]

1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]

AMENDMENT XI

Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]

Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.

The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit, in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII
[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.] ,
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President,

ADDENDUM
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Section
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XL
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.

Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries
Ordinance
Elections and Right of Suffrage
Distribution of Powers
Legislative Department
Executive Department
Judicial Department
Congressional and Legislative Apporti
ment
Education
Counties, Cities and Towns
Corporations
Revenue and Taxation
Public Debt
Militia
Labor
Water Rights
Forestry
Public Buildings and State Institutions
Public Lands
Salaries
Miscellaneous
Amendment and Revision
Schedule

Section 1. [Inherent a n d inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.

1896

Sec. 2. [All political p o w e r inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is a n inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land.
1896

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from t h e Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]

Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed.
The State shall make no law respecting a n establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining t h e lawful use
of arms.
1984
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to support the
charge; or

443
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61-2-11

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

mance of any of the acts specified in this chapter from
any person except the principal broker with whom he
is affiliated and licensed. An inactive licensee is not
authorized to conduct real estate transactions until
he becomes affiliated with a licensed principal broker. No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate
with more than one principal broker at the same
time. Except as provided by rule, a principal broker
may not be responsible for more than one real estate
brokerage at the same time.
1987
61-2-11. Investigations — Subpoena p o w e r of
division — Revocation or suspension
of license — Grounds.
The division may investigate or cause to be investigated the actions of any principal broker, associate
broker, sales agent, real estate school, course provider, or school instructor licensed or certified by this
state, or of any applicant for licensure or certification,
or of any person who acts in any of those capacities
within this state. The division is empowered to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require by subpoena duces tecum the production of books, papers,
contracts, records, other documents, or information
considered relevant to the investigation. Each failure
to respond to a subpoena is considered as a separate
violation of this chapter. The commission, with the
concurrence of the director, may impose a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per violation or
3uspend, revoke, place on probation, or deny reissuance of any license or the certification of a real estate
school course provider or instructor if at any time the
licensee or certificate holder, whether acting as an
agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character
likely to influence, persuade, or induce;
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course
of misrepresentation, or of making false promises
through agents, sales agents, advertising, or otherwise;
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction without the informed consent of all parties;
(5) acting as an associate broker or sales agent
while not licensed with a licensed principal broker, representing or attempting to represent a
broker other than the principal broker with
whom he is affiliated, or representing as sales
agent or having a contractual relationship similar to that of sales agent with other than a licensed principal broker;
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his
possession which belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those
funds from the purpose for which they were received;
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as defined by the commission, to any person not licensed under this chapter, except that
valuable consideration may be shared with a licensed principal broker of another jurisdiction or
fc as provided under the Professional Corporation
Act;
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a
principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent
in such manner as to safeguard the interests of
the public;
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all

462

documents to all parties executing the documents;
(10) failing to keep and make available for inspection by the division a record of each transaction, including the names of buyers and sellers,
the identification of the property, the sale price,
any monies received in trust, any agreements or
instructions from buyers or sellers, and any other
information required by rule;
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase or sale of property, whether the purchase
or sale is made for himself or for an undisclosed
principal;
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving
moral turpitude;
(13) advertising the availability of real estate
or the services of a licensee in a false, misleading,
or deceptive manner;
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who is a branch manager, failing to exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of
his licensees and any unlicensed staff;
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an
order of the commission, or the rules adopted by
the commission and the division;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal in a real estate transaction;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing; or
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule.
1991
61-2-12. Disciplinary action — Judicial review.
(1) (a) (i) Before imposing a civil penalty, revoking, suspending, placing on probation, or reissuance of any license or certificate, the division shall give notice to the licensee or certificate holder and schedule a n adjudicative
proceeding.
(ii) If the licensee is an active sales agent
or active associate broker, the division shall
inform the principal broker with whom the
licensee is affiliated of the charge and of the
time and place of the hearing.
(iii) If after the hearing the commission
determines that any licensee or certificate
holder is guilty of a violation of this chapter,
the license or certificate may be suspended,
revoked, denied reissuance, or a civil penalty
may be imposed by written order of the commission in concurrence with the director.
(b) If the hearing is delegated by the commission to an administrative law judge, and a ruling
has been issued by the commission and the director, the licensee or certificate holder may request
reconsideration by the commission by filing a
written request stating specific grounds upon
which relief is requested.
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder, licensee,
or person aggrieved, including the complainant,
may obtain judicial review or agency review by
the executive director of any adverse ruling, order, or decision of the director and the commission.
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or licensee prevails in the appeal and the court finds
that the state action was undertaken without
substantial justification, the court may award
reasonable litigation expenses to the applicant,
certificate holder, or licensee as provided under
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SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISIOI

Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act.
(c) (if No order, rule, or decision of the director
and the commission may take effect until 30
days after the time for appeal to the court
has expired.
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the
division shall stay enforcement of the commission's action in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-18.
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(3) The commission and the director shall comply
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative proceedings. 1991
61-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal
broker's license — Automatic inactivation of affiliated associate brokers and sales agents licenses.
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chapter committed by any real estate sales agent or associate broker employed or engaged as a n independent
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal broker or committed by any employee, officer, or member
of a licensed principal broker is cause for t h e revocation, suspension, or probation of the principal broker's license, or for the imposition of a fine against
the principal broker in a n amount not to exceed $500
per violation.
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal broker license automatically inactivates every associate
broker or sales agent license granted to those persons
by reason of their affiliation with the principal broker
whose license was revoked or suspended, pending a
change of broker affiliation. A principal broker shall,
prior to the effective date of the suspension or revocation of his license, notify in writing every licensee
affiliated with him of the revocation or suspension of
his license.
1991
61-2-14. List of licensees to b e available.
The division shall make available at reasonable
cost a list of the names and addresses of all persons
licensed by it under this chapter.
1963
61-2-15, 61-2-16.

Repealed.

1973

61-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter.
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to being subject to a license sanction or a fine
ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction of a
first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any
imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six
months. If the violator is a corporation, it is, upon
conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent
violation, an individual is guilty of a third degree
felony; imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed
two years. If a corporation is convicted of a second or
subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree
felony. Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any
member or agent of a partnership or association, who
personally participates in or is an accessory to any
violation of this chapter by such corporation, partnership, or association, is subject to t h e penalties prescribed for individuals.
(2) If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as commission, compensation, or profit by or in
consequence of a violation of this chapter, that person
is liable for an additional penalty of not less than the
amount of the money received and not more than

three times the amount of mom
determined by the court. This
for in any court of competent ji
ered by any person aggrieved
benefit.
(3) All fines imposed by the
executive director pursuant to
deposited into the Real Estate
and Recovery Fund to be used i:
with the requirements of the
Fund Act.
61-2-18. Actions for recove:
restricted.
(1) No person may bring or i
any court of this state for t h e i
sion, fee, or compensation for a:
rendered which is prohibited i
other than licensed principal br
son was duly licensed a s a pr
time of the doing of t h e act or i
(2) No sales agent or associs
his own name for the recovery c
compensation for services a s i
ciate broker unless the action i
broker with whom he is or wa
for the recovery of a fee, comi
pensation may only be instituf
principal broker with whom tl
ciate broker is affiliated.
61-2-19.

Repealed

61-2-20. R i g h t s a n d privil<
censeeSc
Real estate licensees m a y
proved by the Utah Real Est*
attorney general and those foi
with the following exceptior
(1) Principal brokers
may fill out any documi
closing of a real estate
(2) Real estate license
tate forms prepared by 1<
seller, lessor, or lessee, (
vided that the Real Est
torney general have not
necessary to that transa
61-2-21. R e m e d i e s a n d f
(1) (a) If the director he
any person has been or
tuting violations of this
to t h e director that it i
terest to stop such acts
upon the person a n ord
cease and desist from
(b) Within ten days
the person upon whor
request a n adjudicati
(c) Pending t h e he£
order shall remain ii
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Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Access tq^Justice Act.
(c) (fTfto order, rule, or decision of the director
and the commission may take effect until 30
days after the time for appeal to the court
has expired.
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the
division shall stay enforcement of the commission's action in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-18.
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(3) The commission and the director shall comply
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative proceedings. 1991
61-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal
broker's license — Automatic inactivation of affiliated associate brokers and sales agents licenses.
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chapter committed by any real estate sales agent or associate broker employed or engaged as an independent
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal broker or committed by any employee, officer, or member
of a licensed principal broker is cause for the revocation, suspension, or probation of the principal broker's license, or for the imposition of a fine against
the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500
per violation.
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal broker license automatically inactivates every associate
broker or sales agent license granted to those persons
by reason of their affiliation with the principal broker
whose license was revoked or suspended, pending a
change of broker affiliation. A principal broker shall,
prior to the effective date of the suspension or revocation of his license, notify in writing every licensee
affiliated with him of the revocation or suspension of
his license.
1991
61-2-14. List of licensees to be available.
The division shall make available at reasonable
cost a list of the names and addresses of all persons
licensed by it under this chapter.
1983
61-2-15, 61-2-16.

Repealed.

1973

61-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter.
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to being subject to a license sanction or a fine
ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction of a
first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any
imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six
months. If the violator is a corporation, it is, upon
conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent
violation, an individual is guilty of a third degree
felony; imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed
two years. If a corporation is convicted of a second or
subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree
felony. Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any
member or agent of a partnership or association, who
personally participates in or is an accessory to any
violation of this chapter by such corporation, partnership, or association, is subject to the penalties prescribed for individuals.
(2) If any person receives any money or its equivai—i. n„ «^mmission, compensation, or profit by or in
' - - t.Un+

narxnn

61-2-21

three times the amount of money received, as may be
determined by the court. This penalty may be sued
for in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recovered by any person aggrieved for his own use and
benefit.
(3) All fines imposed by the commission and the
executive director pursuant to this chapter shall be
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research,
and Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent
with the requirements of the Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act.
1986
61-2-18.

Actions for recovery of compensation
restricted.
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in
any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at the
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service.
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
compensation for services as a sales agent or associate broker unless the action is against the principal
broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may only be instituted and brought by the
principal broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated.
1985
61-2-19.

Repealed.

1983

61-2-20. Rights and privileges of real estate li-

censees.
Real estate licensees may fill out those forms approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the
attorney general and those forms provided by statute,
with the following exceptions:
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers
may fill out any documents associated with the
closing of a real estate transaction.
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms prepared by legal counsel of the buyer,
seller, lessor, or lessee, or any legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate Commission and attorney general have not approved a specific form
necessary to that transaction.
1985
61-2-21. Remedies and action for violations.
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that
any person has been or is engaging in acts constituting violations of this chapter, and if it appears
to the director that it would be in the public interest to stop such acts, he shall issue and serve
upon the person an order directing that person to
cease and desist from those acts.
(b) Within ten days after receiving the order,
the person upon whom the order is served may
request an adjudicative proceeding.
(c) Pending the hearing, the cease and desist
order shall remain in effect.
(d) If a request for a hearing is made, the division shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b.
(2) (a) After the hearing, if the commission and
the executive director agree that the acts of the
person violate this chapter, the executive director shall issue an order making the cease and
desist order permanent.
(b) If no hearing is requested and if the person
"
*„ /M. nft p r discontinuing the
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may exclude evidence that is irreleimmaterial, or unduly repetitious;
shall exclude evidence privileged in
:ourts of Utah;
) may receive documentary evidence in
brm of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
rpt contains all pertinent portions of the
nal document;
0 may take official notice of any facts
could be judicially noticed under the
a Rules of Evidence, of the record of
r proceedings before the agency, and of
nical or scientific facts within the
icy's specialized knowledge,
e presiding officer may not exclude evi)lely because it is hearsay,
le presiding officer shall afford to all paropportunity to present evidence, argue,
, conduct cross-examination, and submit
I evidence.
le presiding officer may give persons not
to the adjudicative proceeding the opporto present oral or written statements at
iring.
II testimony presented at the hearing, if
as evidence to be considered in reaching a
a on the merits, shall be given under oath.
Tie hearing shall be recorded at the
's expense.
Iny party, a t his own expense, may have a
approved by the agency prepare a tranof the hearing, subject to any restrictions
te agency is permitted by statute to impose
tect confidential information disclosed at
faring.
Ul hearings shall be open to all parties,
section does not preclude the presiding oftaking appropriate measures necessary to
tie integrity of the hearing.
1988
Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Intervention.
person not a party may file a signed, writ>n to intervene in a formal adjudicative prorith the agency. The person who wishes to
shall mail a copy of the petition to each
Le petition shall include:
the agency's file number or other reference
yer,
the name of the proceeding;
a statement of facts demonstrating that the
ioner's legal rights or interests are substan/ affected by the formal adjudicative proing, or that the petitioner qualifies as a n in3nor under any provision of law; and
) a statement of the relief that the petitioner
s from the agency.
e presiding officer shall grant a petition for
tion if he determines that:
) the petitioner's legal interests may be subttially affected by the formal adjudicative
reeding; and
>) the interests of justice and t h e orderly and
u p t conduct of the adjudicative proceedings
not be materially impaired by allowing the
jrvention.
) Any order granting or denying a petition to
jrvene shall be in writing and sent by mail to
petitioner a n d each party,
b) An order permitting intervention may ime conditions on the intervener's participation
he adjudicative proceeding that are necessary
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for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention.
1987
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of t h e presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by
the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon*
sideration*
(f) a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer may use his experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude t h e presiding officer from issuing interim orders to:
(a) notify the parties of further hearings;
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings
on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for t h e fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding.
1988

63-46b-Il. Default.
(1) The presiding officer may enter a n order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in a n informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the adjudicative
proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under Section
63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of
the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all
parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the
agency set aside the default order, and any order
in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent
to the default order, by following the procedures
outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding
officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review
under Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the
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presiding officer on the motion to set aside the
default.
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun
by a party that has other parties besides the
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after
issuing the order of default, conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the
party in default and shall determine all issues in
the adjudicative proceeding, including those affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the party in
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 1888
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure.
., (1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit par* ties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review
of an order by the agency or by a superior agency,
the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review within 30 days after the issuance of
the order with the person or entity designated for
that purpose by the statute or rule,
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the
relief requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was
mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time period provided
by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may
file a response with the person designated by statute
or rule to receive the response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
agency or superior agency shall review the order
within a reasonable time or within the time required
by statute or the agency's-rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior
agency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
all parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the
agency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party.
(c) The order on review shall containr
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
issues reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion

63-46b-15

of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
1988
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order
is issued for which review by the agency or by a
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to
each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
the request or denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20
days after the filing of the request, the request
for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
1988
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter.
i988
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
to removal or placement decisions regarding children in state custody.
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief.
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
1990
63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1987
63-46b-18.

Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to ail parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:
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78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
1986
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.

(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
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nd which involves the business regulatory functions
f the state, a court may award reasonable litigation
xpenses to any small business which is a named
arty if the small business prevails in the appeal and
he court finds that the state action was undertaken
/ithout substantial justification.
(2) Any state agency or political subdivision may
equire by rule or ordinance that a small business
>xhaust administrative remedies prior to making a
:laim under this act.
1983
T8-27a-6.

Payment of expenses awarded —
Statement required in agency's bud-

get.
Expenses awarded under this act shall be paid from
funds in the regular operating budget of the state
entity. If sufficient funds are not available in the budget of the entity, the expenses shall be considered a
claim governed by the provisions of Title 63, Chapter
6. Every state entity against which litigation expenses have been awarded under this act shall, at the
time of submission of its proposed budget, submit a
report to the governmental body which appropriates
its funds in which the amount of expenses awarded
and paid under this act during the fiscal year is
stated.
1983
CHAPTER 27b
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR EQUINE
ACTIVITIES
Section
78-27b-101.
78-27b-102.

Definitions.
Equine activity liability limitations.

78-27b-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Equine" means any member of the
equidae family.
(2) "Equine activity" means:
(a) equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, racing, sales, or parades that involve any breeds of equines and any equine
disciplines, including dressage, hunter and
jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping,
multiple-day events, combined training, rodeos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple
chasing, hunting, endurance trail riding,
and western games;
(b) boarding or training equines;
(c) teaching persons equestrian skills;
(d) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an
equine owned by another person regardless
of whether the owner receives monetary or
other valuable consideration;
(e) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an
equine by a prospective purchaser; or
(f) other equine activities of any type including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or
spontaneous activities sponsored by an
equine activity sponsor.
(3) "Equine activity sponsor" means an individual, group, club, partnership, or corporation,
whether operating for profit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for an equine activity, including:
(a) pony clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, 4H programs, therapeutic riding programs,
and public and private schools and post sec-

ondary educational instituti
equine activities; and
(b) operators, instructors
of equine facilities, stab
ponyride strings, fairs, anc
(4) "Equine professional" mea
pensated for an equine activity
(a) instructing a particip
(b) renting to a participe
ride, drive, or be a pass
equine; or
(c) renting equine equipr
participant.
(5) "Participant" means any
amateur or professional, who di
an equine activity, regardless
has been paid to participate.
(6) (a) "Person engaged in ar
means a person who ride
drives, or works with an
(b) Subsection (a) does n<
tator at an equine activity c
an equine activity who doe
lead, or drive an equine.
78-27b-102. Equine activity liab
(1) An equine activity sponsor i
sional is not liable for an injury to
participant engaged in an equine at
sponsor or professional:
(a) (i) provided the equipme
(ii) the equipment or ta
jury;
(b) (i) provided the equine;
(ii) failed to make reasor
efforts to determine whet
(A) the participan
safely in the equine a
manage the particula
(B) the equine cou
with the participant;
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is i
and control of land or facilitie
participant sustained injuries
gerous condition which was k:
have been known to t h e spom
and for which warning signs r
spicuously posted;
(d) (i) commits an act or oir
tutes negligence, gross nej
or wanton disregard for th
ticipant; and
(ii) that act or omission
or
(e) intentionally injures or c
the participant.
(2) This chapter does not preve
bility of an equine activity sponso
fessional who is:
(a) a veterinarian licensee
Chapter 28, in an action to re
incurred in the course of pro
treatment of an equine;
(b) liable under Title 4, C
and Trespassing Animals; or
(c) liable under Title 78, C
Liability Act.
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senting his own interests in a cause to which he is a
party in his own right and not as assignee.
1963

the purpose of remittance an
late that section.

78-51-26. Duties of attorneys and counselors.
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor:

78-51-29. Permitting use <
Penalty.
If an attorney knowingly \
being his general law partnei
to sue out any process or to }
action in his name as counsel
such attorney, and every p<
name, is guilty of a misdeme
ished accordingly, and his lie
revoked or suspended.

(1) to support the Constitution and the laws of
the United States and of this state;
(2) to maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;
(3) to counsel or maintain no other action, proceeding or defense than that which appears to
him legal and just, excepting the defense of a
person charged with a public offense;
(4) to employ for the purposes of maintaining
the causes confided to him such means only as
are consistent with truth, and never to seek to
mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(5) to maintain inviolate the confidences, and
at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets;
of his client;
(6) to abstain from all offensive personality,
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or a witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he
is charged;
(7) not to encourage either the commencement
or continuance of an action or proceeding from
any corrupt motive or passion or interest;
(8) never to reject for any consideration personal to himself the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed; and
(9) to comply with all duly approved rules and
regulations prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah State Bar and to pay the fees
provided by law.
1953
78-51-27. Certain conduct forbidden — Penalty.
An attorney or counselor shall not:

(1) directly or indirectly buy, or be in any
manner interested in buying or having assigned
to him, for the purpose of collection, a bond,
promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or
other thing in action, with the intent and for the
purpose of bringing an action thereon.
(2) by himself, or by or in the name of another
person, either before or after action brought,
promise or give, or procure to be promised or
given, a valuable consideration to any person as
an inducement to placing, or in consideration of
having placed, in his hands or in the hands of
another person a demand of any kind for the purpose of bringing action thereon or of representing
the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy
for the recovery thereof; but this subdivision does
not apply to any agreement between attorneys
and counselors to divide between themselves the
compensation to be received.
An attorney or counselor who violates either of the
foregoing subdivisions of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished accordingly, and
his license to practice may be revoked or suspended.
1953

78-51-28. Exceptions.
The next preceding section [Section 78-51-27] does
not prohibit an attorney or counselor from receiving a
bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or
other thing in action, in payment for property sold, or
for services actually rendered, or for a debt
antecedently contracted; or from buying or receiving
a bill of exchange, draft or other thing in action for

78-51-30. Partnership wit
An attorney who directly <
relation to, or aids or promc
actiun or proceeding in any c
which is carried on, aided or j
public prosecutor with whom
or indirectly connected as a {
himself prosecuted or in am
moted any action or proceedin
prosecutor, afterwards direct
in relation to, or takes an;
thereof as an attorney or oth
receives any valuable conside
of any defendant in any such
standing or agreement whate
relating to the defense there*
meanor and shall be punish*
license to practice may be revc
78-51-31. Deceit and colic
An attorney and counselor \
collusion, or who consents thi
ceive a court or judge or a pa
ceeding is liable to be disbar
the injured party treble dama
civil action.
78-51-32. Authority of a
selors.
An attorney and counselor
(1) to execute in the m
or other written instr
proper for the prosecution
ing about to be or alread:
prosecution or defense of i
an action, proceeding or f
therein.
(2) to bind his client ir
action or proceeding by h
the clerk or entered up
court, and not otherwise
(3) to receive money c
an action or proceeding
thereof or after judgment
his authority is filed, and
and not otherwise, to dis
knowledge satisfaction of
78-51-33. Proof of authori
The court may on motion of
showing of reasonable groun
attorney for the adverse part:
eral adverse parties, to produ
oath or otherwise the author
pears, and until he does so m
by him on behalf of the partie
to appear.
78-51-34. Change of attar
The attorney in any actioi
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for lease or rent, procuring prospective tenants or lessees, negotiating lea^e or rental terms, and executing
lease or rental agreements
R162-5-3. Exemptions.
5.3 This rule does not apply to*
5.3.1 Support Services. Individuals who, as regular
salaried employees of a licensed property management
company or a licensed principal broker: show properties
to prospective tenants; provide services as bookkeepers;
function as secretaries, maintenance stafT, and rent collectors; or who fill out pre-printed lease or rental agreements, the terms of which are not negotiable by the
person completing the form.
5.3.2 Resident Manager. Individuals who reside onsite at the property address; or
5.3.3 Owners or Employees. Individuals who are owners or regular salaried employees of an owner and who
do not provide property management services for more
than one employer.
R162-5-4. Broker Supervision.
5.4 All property management conducted by a salesagent or associate broker is to be supervised by the principal broker with whom the licensee is affiliated.
Rl62-5-5. Separate Company.
5.5 A license to operate a property management company separate from the real estate brokerage will be
granted upon compliance with the following conditions:
5.5.1 Application. The principal broker must submit
to the Division an application form required by the
Division together with the proper application fee.
5.5.2 Business Name Approval. The applicant must
submit evidence that the name of the new company has
been approved by the Division of Corporations of the
Department of Commerce.
5.5.3 Company Affiliation. The principal broker must
designate the company affiliation of each of the licensees affiliated with him in either the brokerage or the
property management company.
KEY: real estate business
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R162-6. Licensee Conduct.
R162-6-1. Improper Practices.
R162-6-2. Standards of Practice.
R162-6-1. Improper Practices.
6.1.1 Loan Fraud. A licensee shall not participate in a
transaction in which a buyer enters into any agreement
that is not disclosed to the lender, which, if disclosed,
may have a material effect on the terms or the granting
of the loan.
6.1.1.1 Double Contracts. A licensee shall not use or
propose the use of two or more contracts of sale or Earnest Money Sales Agreements, one of which is not made
known to the prospective lender or loan guarantor.
6.1.2 Signs. It is prohibited for any licensee to have a
sign on real property without the written consent of the
property owner.
6.1.3 Licensee's Interest in a Transaction. A licensee
shall not buy, sell, or lease/rent any real property as a
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principal either directly or mdirectK without nr-t di
closing, m writing on the Earnest Monej Saie- Agrer
ment or the leasts rental agreement his true position as
principal in the transaction. A licensee will be considered to be a principal for the purposes of this rule if he
is an owner, officer, director, partner, member, or
employee of an entity which is a principal in the transaction. In the case of a licensee who is a stockholder but
who is not an officer, director or employee of a corporation which is a principal in the transaction, the licensee
will be considered to be a principal for the purposes of
this rule if he owns more than 10% of the stock of the
corporation.
6.1.4 Listing Content. The real estate licensee completing a listing agreement is responsible to make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy and content of the
listing.
6.1.4.1 Net listings are prohibited and shall not be
taken by a licensee.
6.1.5 Advertising.
6.1.5.1 Any advertising by active licensees that does
not include the name of the real estate brokerage is prohibited except as otherwise stated herein.
6.1.5.2 If the licensee advertises property in which he
has an ownership interest and the property is not
listed, the ad need not appear over the name of the real
estate brokerage if the ad includes the phrase "owneragent".
6.1.5.3 Under no circumstances should a licensee
advertise or offer to sell property at a lower price than
that listed without the written consent of the seller.
6.1.6 Double Commissions. In order to avoid subjecting the seller to paying double commissions, licensees
must not sell listed properties other than through the
listing broker. A licensee shall not subject a principal to
paying a double commission without the principal's
consent.
6.1.6.1 A licensee shall not enter or attempt to enter
into a concurrent agency representation agreement
with a buyer or a seller when the licensee knows or
should know of an existing agency representation
agreement with another licensee.
6.1.7 Retention of Buyer's Deposit. A principal broker
holding an earnest money deposit shall not be entitled
to any of the deposit without the written consent of the
buyer and the seller.
6.1.8 Unprofessional conduct. No licensee shall
engage in any of the practices described in 61-2-2, et
seq. (1953, as amended), whether acting as agent or on
his own account, in a manner which fails to conform
with accepted standards of the real estate sales, leasing
or management industries and which could jeopardize
the public health, safety, or welfare and includes the
violation of any provision of 61-2-2, et seq. (1953, as
amended) or the rules of this chapter.
6.1.9 Finder's Fees. A licensee may not pay a finder's
fee or give any valuable consideration to an unlicensed
person or entity for referring a prospect in a real estate
transaction, except as provided in this rule.
6.1.9.1 Token gifts. A licensee may give a gift valued
at less than $50 to an individual in appreciation for an
unsolicited referral of a prospect which resulted in a
real estate transaction.

R162-6-2 Standards of Practice.
6 2 1 Approved Forms The following standard forms
are approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and
the Office of the Attorney General for use by all licensees
(a) July 1, 1987 Earnest Money Sales Agreement,
(b) October 1, 1988 Earnest Money Sales Agreement
for Residential Construction,
(c) January 1, 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract,
(d) October 1, 1983 All Inclusive Trust Deed,
(e) October 1, 1983 All Inclusive Promissory Note
Secured by All Inclusive Trust Deed
6 2 1 1 Forms Required for Closing Principal brokers
and associate brokers may fill out forms in addition to
the standard state-approved forms if the additional
forms are necessary to close a transaction Examples
include, but are not limited to, closing statements, and
warranty or quit claim deeds
6 2 1 2 Forms Prepared by an Attorney Any licensee
may fill out forms prepared by the buyer's attorney or
the seller's attorney to be used m place of any form
listed in Rule 6 2 1 (a) through (e) if the buyer or the
seller requests that such forms be used and the licensee
verifies that the forms have in fact been drafted by the
buyer's or seller's attorney
6 2 1 3 Additional Forms If it is necessary for a licensee to use a form for which there is no state-approved
form (e g , a lease), the licensee may fill in the blanks on
any form which has been prepared by an attorney,
regardless of whether the attorney was employed for
the purpose by the buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, brokerage, or an entity whose business enterprise is selling
blank legal forms
6 2 1 4 Standard Supplementary Clauses There are
Standard Supplementary Clauses approved by the
Utah Real Estate Commission which may be added to
Earnest Money Sales Agreements by all licensees The
use of the Standard Supplementary Clauses will not be
considered the unauthorized practice of law
6 2 2 Copies of Earnest Money Sales Agreement After
an Earnest Money Sales Agreement is properly signed
by both the buyer and seller, it is the responsibility of
each participating licensee to cause copies thereof,
bearing all signatures, to be delivered or mailed to the
buyer and seller with whom such licensee is dealing
The licensee preparing the document shall not have the
parties sign for a final copy of the document prior to all
parties signing the contract evidencing agreement to
the terms thereof
6 2 3 Residential Construction Agreement The Earnest Money Sales Agreement for Residential Construction must be used for all transactions for the
construction of dwellings to be built or presently under
construction for which a Certificate of Occupancy has
not been issued
6 2 4 Employee Licensee A real estate licensee working as a regular salaned employee as defined in section
1 of these rules, who sells real estate owned by the
employer, may only do so and may only be compensated
directly by the employer under one of the following conditions (1) the licensee is a principal broker, (2) the
employer has on its staff a principal broker with whom
the licensee affiliates, or (3) the employer contracts
with a principal broker so that all employed licensees

arp affiliated with and ^uptrvi^ed bv a principal brokc^
6 2 5 Real Estate ^uctiona \ principal bru^*- \u
contracts or in anv manner affiliates with an autM necr
or auction company which is not licensed under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-1 et seq
(1953, as amended) for the purpose of enabling that
auctioneer or auction company to auction real property
in this state, shall be responsible to assure that all
aspects of the auction comply with the requirements of
this section and all other laws otherwise applicable to
real estate licensees in real estate transactions Auctioneers and auction companies who are not licensed
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-2-1 et seq (1953, as amended) may conduct auctions
of real property located within this state upon the following conditions
6 2 5 1 Advertising All advertising and promotional
materials associated with an auction must conspicuously disclose that the auction is conducted under the
supervision of a named principal broker licensed in this
state, and
6 2 5 2 Supervision The auction must be conducted
under the supervision of a principal broker licensed in
this state who must be present at the auction, and
6 2 5 3 Use of Approved Forms Any Earnest Money
Sales Agreements used at the auction must meet the
requirements of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-20
(1953, as amended) and must be filled out by a Utah
real estate licensee, and
6 2 5 4 Placement of Deposits All monies deposited at
the auction must be placed either in the real estate
trust account of the principal broker who is supervising
the auction or in an escrow depository agreed to m writing by the parties to the transaction
6 2 5 5 Closing Arrangements The principal broker
supervising the auction shall be responsible to assure
that adequate arrangements are made for the closing of
each real estate transaction arising out of the auction
6 2 6 Guaranteed Sales As used herein, the term
"guaranteed sales plan" includes, but is not limited to
(a) any plan in which a seller's real estate is guaranteed
to be sold or, (b) any plan whereby a licensee or anyone
affiliated with a licensee will purchase a seller's real
estate if it is not purchased by a third party in the specified period of a listing or within some other specified
period of time
6 2 6 1 In any real estate transaction involving a
guaranteed sales plan, the licensee shall provide full
disclosure as provided herein regarding the guarantee
(a) Written Advertising Any written advertisement
by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales plan" shall include
a statement advising the seller that if the seller is eligible, costs and conditions may apply and advising the
seller to inquire of the licensee as to the terms of the
guaranteed sales agreement Such information shall be
set forth in pnnt at least one-fourth as large as the largest print in the advertisement
(b) Radio/Television Advertising Any radio or television advertisement by a licensee of a "guaranteed sales
plan" shall include a conspicuous statement advising if
any conditions and limitations apply
(c) Guaranteed Sales Agreements Every guaranteed
sales agreement must be in writing and contain all of
the conditions and other terms under which the property is guaranteed to be sold or purchased, including
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:he charges or other costs for the service or plan, the
price for which the property will be sold or purchased
md the approximate net proceeds the seller may reasonably expect to receive.
6 2 7 Agency Disclosure. In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as agent or principal, the licensee must clearly disclose in writing to the buyer and
seller, lessor and lessee, his agency relationship(s). The
disclosure must be made prior to the buyer and seller,
lessor and lessee entering into a binding agreement
with each other and become part of the permanent file.
When a binding agreement is signed, the prior agency
disclosure must be confirmed in a separate provision
incorporated in or attached to that agreement, which
shall be as follows:
"AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this
agreement the listing agent represents ( ) Buyer ( )
Seller, and the selling agent represents ( ) Buyer ( )
Seller. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing
this agreement written disclosure of the agency relationship(s) was provided to him/her. ( ) (Buyer's Initials) ( ) (Seller's Initials).''
6.2.8 Duty to Inform. Sales agents and associate brokers must keep their principal broker and/or branch
manager informed on a timely basis of all real estate
transactions in which the licensee is involved, as agent
:>r principal, in which the licensee has received funds on
t>ehalf of the principal broker or in which an offer has
oeen written.
6.2.9 Broker Supervision. Principal brokers and associate brokers who are branch managers shall be responsible for exercising active supervision over the conduct
of all licensees affiliated with them.
6.2.9.1 A broker will not be held responsible for inadsquate supervision if:
(a) An affiliated licensee violates a provision of Utah
Code Annotated 61-2-1, et seq., or the rules promulgated thereunder, in contravention of the supervising
broker's specific written policies or instructions; and
(b) Reasonable procedures were established by the
broker to ensure that licensees receive adequate supervision and the broker has followed those procedures;
and
(c) Upon learning of the violation, the broker
attempted to prevent or mitigate the damage; and
(d) The broker did not participate in the violation; and
(e) The broker did not ratify the violation; and
(0 The broker did not attempt to avoid learning of the
violation.
6.2.9.2 The existence of an independent contractor
relationship or any other special compensation
arrangement between the broker and affiliated licensees shall not release the broker and licensees of any
duties, obligations, or responsibilities.
6.2.10 Disclosure of Fees. If a real estate licensee who
is acting as an agent in a transaction will receive any
type of fee in connection with a real estate transaction
in addition to a real estate commission, that fee must be
disclosed in writing to all parties to the transaction.
6.2.11 Fees from Builders. All fees paid to a licensee
for referral of prospects to builders must be paid to the
licensee by the principal broker with whom he is
licensed and affiliated. All such fees must be disclosed
as required by Rule 6.2.10.
6.2.12 Fees from Manufactured Housing Dealers. If a
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licensee refers a prospect to a manufactured home
dealer or a mobile home dealer, as such terms are
defined in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-56-1, et
seq., any fee paid for the referral of a prospect must be
paid to him by the principal broker with whom he is
licensed and affiliated if the sale of the manufactured
home or mobile home was made in conjunction with the
sale or lease of real property. If the sale was not made
as part of a transaction involving the sale or lease of
real property, the fee is not a real estate commission
and need not be paid to the licensee by his principal broker; however, the fee must be disclosed as required by
Rule 6.2.10.
6.2.13 Gifts and Inducements. A gift given by a principal broker to a buyer or seller in a real estate transaction as an inducement to use the services of a
brokerage, or in appreciation for having used the services of a brokerage, is permissible and is not an illegal
sharing of commission. If an inducement is to be offered
to a party who will not be obligated to pay a real estate
commission in a transaction, the principal broker must
obtain from the party who will pay the commission
written consent that the inducement be offered.
6.2.14 "Due-On-Sale" Clauses. Real estate licensees
have an affirmative duty to disclose in writing to buyers
and sellers the existence or possible existence of a "dueon-sale" clause in an underlying encumbrance on real
property, and the potential consequences of selling or
purchasing a property without obtaining the authorization of the holder of the underlying encumbrance.
KEY: real estate biuineas
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R162-7. Enforcement.
R162-7-1.
R162-7-2.
R162-7-3.
R162-7-4.

Filing of Complaint.
Notice of Complaint.
Investigation and Enforcement.
Corrective Notice.

R162-7-1. Filing of Complaint.
7.1 An aggrieved person may file a complaint in writing against a licensee; or the Division or the Commission may initiate a complaint upon its own motion for
alleged violation of the provisions of these rules or of
Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-1, et seq. (1953, as
amended). The Division will not entertain complaints
between licensees regarding claims to commissions.
R162-7-2. Notice of Complaint.
7.2 When the Division notifies a licensee of a complaint against him, the notice must be in writing. The
licensee must respond to the complaint within ten business days after receipt of the notice from the Division.
Failure to respond to the notice of complaint or any subsequent requests for information from the Division
within the required time period, will be considered an
additional violation of these rules and separate grounds
for disciplinary action against the licensee.
R162-7-3. Investigation and Enforcement.
7.3 The investigative and enforcement activities of
the Division shall include, but not be limited to the following: investigation of information provided on new
license applications; evaluation and investigation of
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